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THE L[\llTS OF "ABSOLlITF A:"D PIRFECT CANDOR"

Does an attorney owe a client a duty or "absolute and perfcct
candor?" More than a dozen recent cases from Texas, California,
Oklahoma, and the District of Columbia ha\e used this phrase to
describe an attorney's fiduciary obligations, I Figuratively, thc expression sets a useful moral tone, for it makes clear that lawyers
must diligently apprise clients of matters bearing upon their affairs,
Absent such information, a consumer of legal services would oftcn
be unable to chart an intelligent course, and to that extent would
be deprived of the right to self-determinalion,~
However, "candor" entails a duty to disclose information without request as well as a duty to respond honestly when an inquin
is made,' If the phrase "absolute and perfect candor" is read literl. See Part III ill Fra.
2. Cf ].\\lLS E. \\OI.IIIR'O, CASES ",n \L\ ITRl\1 S')' I HI, LA\\ G()\'IR'I", L\\\
YI.RS 1<)1 (2000) (stating "Itlhe communication duty is critical to maintaining a qualit\
lawyer-client relationship.
,[I]n order for the client to intelligently manage hi;, own
affairs, the lawyer must explain matters").
3. This interpretation is consistent with ooth dictionary definitions and case precedent. See Till. R·\'I)()\1 HOIS! DlCll"'ARY OF E,( d ISII L\'<OI''\(;F 30:; (2d ed. 19X7)
(defining "candor" as "the: state or quality of oeing frank, open, and sincere in speech or
expression"): WllhllR'S :"1:\\ l',lYFRS,VL L'AllRII)(i1I) DI<'TIO,ARY 263 (2d "d, 19x.')
(delining "candor" as "frankness: sincerity: honesty in
oneself" and <i, ":1 di:,!,")sition to treat other, with fairness: freedom from preludlce or disguise"). The iir,t Texas
decision usinl,! the term "ah'nlutc and perfect candor" to descrioe the ohlil,!:llillll, ,)f an
attorney' to a client imohed an attornc:y''s nondisell)surc' nf the f:let that he had rcccllc'd
compensation from a third I'art\. State \. B:lker, :;,,9 S.\\.2d ,j(.~ i7-+ (Tex. ('1\.'\1'1'.-Austin 197(), l\Tit ref'd n.r.e.1 (per curiam). :"otwithst:lnding that the client had 111<1lk no
n:quest for the information, the court held that ,Ill' client. ":t, a matter of law, was entilkd
to knO\\ in detail whate\er n:l'O\erV ., Ithe attorne\1 \\:Is ahle to ohtain from thc judgment deotor." III. The conciusiun that "ahsolute and
candor" requires discllhllre
of information in the ahsencc nf a request also finds sUI'I'ml In cases :trlsing in other llelds.
'lllC phrase "absolute: :ll1d perfect candor" can he traced I,) Ihe definition of "{(/!,'/TlII/<I{'
fidn" in HI .\' r;'s L\\\ DI' II< "\In. Sce ill. (applvini'. Ih,' kl'l11 10 the allorne\'-l'iienl r,'LItionship). The ductrine uf "((hamllll/' tides" has been h... ld il) applv' to marInc 111SUl':II1CC.
Sec, C.g., Houston Cas. Co, y. ('crtain l'nderwriters al Llmd\ LDndon,:; I F. Supp. ~d -,,<J,
x02 (S.D. ·kx. 1999) (as\ertll1g that an omission lll:llCrI:ti to risk \iolalCs the d')Clrllle
whether it is made \\illfulh or accidentally). Addrc'sslni'. lS'ues in the marine insllranc'e
context. courts have written:

This stringent doctrine requin:s the assured to discil)se to the insurer all known circumstances that materially affect the risk oeing insured. Since the assured is in the
best position to know of al1\ circumstances material to the risk. he must reveal those
lacts to the underwriter. rather than wait for the undenHiter to inquire,
Home In,. Cn. \, Spectrum Info. Techs .. Inc" 93() F. Supp. 1\25. X,,6 (E.D.N.Y. 1<)96) (quoting with approval Knight \. ('.S. Fire Ins. Co .. XO-+ F.2d 9, I:; (2d ('ir. 19x6)).
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ally and without qualification, it cannot possibly be an accurate
statement of an attorney's obligations under all circumstances. To
begin with, such a standard would be impractical. A duty of candor that is '"absolute and perfect" would require a lawyer to convey
to a client every piece of data coming into the lawyer's possession,
no matter how duplicative, arcane, unreliable, or insignificant. Little would be gained by imposing such an exacting obligation, and
much would be lost in terms of efficiency and expense.-+ If lawyers
were required to be mere relayers of information and not permitted to exercise judgment in terms of what facts to convey to clients,
the legal system would run far less smoothly than it does today. It
has been impressively urged that the essence of good lawyering is
the exercise of judgment.~ Arguably, e\aluative discretion must
extend just as readily to communicating with clients, as to investigating facts, examining witnesses, negotiating deals, drafting documents, or crafting solutions.
An unbending requirement of "absolute and perfect candor"
would also leave no room for competing interests favoring the privacy of information that a client might in some sense want or even
need to know. Such competing interests arise in an infinite variety
of situations, and occasionally they may be of sufficient weight to
warrant accommodation. The issue here can be drawn in relief by
just a few questions. Does the duty of "absolute and perfect candor" require a lawyer to disclose that he or she: (a) is currently
suffering marital difficulties that could affect the quality of the representation'?, (b) was granted special accommodations in law
school for a learning disability,?," (c) failed the bar examination on

.+. SCi' 'it'llera//l SIII'III '. ('IIIIYS. RI·(,ILAII"'. <II L\\\)Ll'~: PR()IlLE\I~ ()f L\\\
E Illi<S 7'+-7~ (~th cd. 1\.)\.):-;) (diSCUssing. the conflict hctwccn an attorneY's dut\' of
dilig.cllcc and dut\ [() cclJ11Jl1unicatc).
). SCI' A'. I ll"'.) T. KJ<"'.\IA'.. Till Losl L\\\,> I I{ .' (I()\.)-') (discussing thc idc;!lllf
the law\er-statesJl1an and assenin;'. "it IS thiS qualit\ ()iIUci!lI1le:nt that thc ideal nl thc law\'er-stalt.',man \aluc~ most"): id. at hi (CXplalnill;'. "c,cc'lkncc of juci;'.ll1cnt"): id. Cit ().i (discussing. "e,cellencc ollucig.mcnt").
h. (I France, A, \Ic\!mris. A 'pirillg {({III('/' lIull /)n/Clia Cels Ii',I{ ilccess. W \1 I
Sr. .I .. July li-i. 1\.)97. at 131. 1997 WL-\VSJ 2.+2:-;2.+) (Slatll1;'.. in a diSCUSSion of a lawvcr who
was g.ranted double time to take: the har exam. "laJlthllu;,'.h IcJwyers aren't required to disclose their disabilitic's to clicnts, he says hc felt it wasn't ethical to charg.e for all 01 his
tiJl1e" that he took to n.:ad records and write letters while work in;'. lor clients). In I 99().
Cong.ress passed the Americans with Disahilities Act. One 01 the consequences is that
cducational institutions arc now required to provide special accommodations for students
with learning. disahilities. which mav include sLlch things as extra time to complete tests
·\'.1)
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the first try?, or (d) knows interesting. but nones~cntial. confidential information about a friend of the client? Each of these questions raises an issue as to whether other interests can take
precedence over the attorney's duty of candor to the client. At a
minimum. competing interests should not automatically be disregarded simply because a lawyer-client relationship exists. Consequently. "absolute and perfect candor" must ine\itably mean
something less than total disclosure of everything a lawyer knows
that might be of interest or use to a client.
The question of what a lawyer must disclose to a client is of ubiquitous importance. Lawyers face this issue with respect to everything they learn about their client's affairs. This Article will probe
the limits of the concept of "absolute and perfect candor" in the
context of civil liability. for malpractice actions frequently allege
that attorneys have failed to disclose sufficient information to a c1ient. 7 This Article will show that the disclosure obligations owed by
lawyers to clients, while of eminent imporl nce and mightily demanding, are not always "absolute and perfect" in terms of the duties they entail. This Article argues that the concept of "absolute
and perfect candor" applies only in selected areas of legal representation (such as business transactions between attorneys and c1ients S and within the terms of specific rules relating to matters such
as conflict of interest.') client funds and property, 1<1 contract initia-

(e.g .. douhle time). privale exam morns_ and COI11PUICf., or olher cljulj11llCnL .<;", ticl/cwll\'
Donald H. Stone. }VIIIII L(/I\' Schou/, .. II''' noill;,; {() ACcolllllloi/alc SIIII/"IIIS ,,'ilh '-cIIl'llilll.;
Disahililies . .+2 S. TI \,. L RI \. I 'i. ~h (2()OO I (discus,in>2 d. ~()mmo(LIII011S I
7. -')CC, e.g.. T\\o Thirt\ :\ine .101111 \enlure \ . .Iue. IJ() S.\\,,'cI ,S'ill. ()()I) (k'(. r\pp.-Dallas 2001. peL filed) (re~ardin~ :111 ,I(lj<m for Ie~al malpractice'. hrc'dch Df fiduciarY dut\
and lovaltv duty hascd on failurc 10 dl,cl,\sc' lhat the all()fIle\. ,h ,I m':Il1I'er of city coullcil.
would or could lake' positions lhat \\ould ;Ifkel lhc' rc':iI estale Irall'ilCllon, in which lhe
firm represented the plaintiff) . .'leI' ~1'II('/'(/II\.I1 111{1 ) \1. S\1I11! c\': R, ,... \1 I) E. \! \11 I ....
PRF\'I'.II'o,'; 1.1(;.\1. \!\II'R\( Ii( I S.~ II')S,)) (
lhat dll<)r!le\s Ll1lurc 10 slliricientl\' anal\'ze cliems and transaCllOI]'. has produced a 'ii>2nificanl illll<lUnl of malpractice
litigation).
S. Sec Golden :\llggCt. Inc, \, Ibm. ~)"9 P.2d 17.'. 17:'1 (:\e\, I'P») (holdine'. lhal i\
corpora Ie director. \\ho oblained a lea,chold with an oplion to purch:lse' ,II a lime whel1 lhe
corporation had an interesl in ilCljllirin>2 such proper\\. had :1 "lIut\ to lhe (Orpor:1Iion. ;IS
its allofllev. not only to inform . . [the corporationj full\ of lhe iaclu;iI circumstances of
the transaction. bUI also ... of its rights in re~ard thereto").
'I. Sec Conom Inc. \. Baskin. Sit, S.W.2d '+111 . .+19 (Tes. App.~-Ell'a'io 19<J1.llo \\fill
(stating that the Texas Disciplinar\ Rules of Prokssional Conducl permil "an ,1lIOfne\ or
law firm to conlinue Illultiple reprcsenlalion of adversan clients \\ herc'
_ consent is
ohtained frolll each client after full chclosure of the esistence. 11i1IUre. Il11pllCallllns and
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tion, II and settlement offers). I.' Otherwise the disclosure obliga-

pw,sibJc aun:rs<: Clll1Sequcnces of ,uch Illulllj,k rL'pres<:nLllilln"): \i'(' 1!I,n Simp,on \.
JaIlles, 90:; F.2u 372 ..'.17 ('\th Cir. 1990) (>i\dlin" Ihal. und<:r!csas la\\ for real <:Slal<: transactions. once an attorney has und<:naKen full disclo'llre. in '<lI11e circul1lsl.lncc, lh"re 111<1\'
not be a conflict of mlerest if the attorn<:\ rqlr<:scIlts hnth p~lr\lesl: Ell1l'lo\er, Casualty
Co. \. Tillc\. -l9!J S. W.2d '\';2. 'i'iS (Tex. 197.' 1 (sut in',! that .. [ iJt a conflict MISCS bel\\eCn the
inll'rcsts of the insur<:r and the insur<:d. IhL' ~111')rIlL'\ ,)\\eS a dut\ tll th..: II1slll'cd to immediatch ad\ise him of th" conlliet"): lim Tillrn \ill,' .10/111 \ '('111111'1'. hI) S.\\ ..'d at 900 (concluding that <In attorn,,\'s fiduciary duty to a L'IIl'l1t Includes th..: dlSL'l,lSurL' "I ,tl1\ cOl1liicts
nf interest that cnuld affect an altl)rn<:\'s rCl'r\.:SL'IlLilillll ,)f thc clicnl's 1111>:rL'sls l10. Sec \Io!)! I RI liS 1)1 PIH>I'I ('1) .... 111' I R. 1.1'i(dl (20()2) (sl.llll1'-' Ilul "Iuipon
rccci\in',! funds or othcr propcrt\ In \\hich a cllL'nt or Ihlrd persun 11.Is .111 Il1krL'sl. a 1<1\\\cr
shall promptl\ l1oti!\ the client or third pcr'<)I1. . ~lI1d. upon rcqucst h\ Ihc L'lient or third
pef';on. shall promptl\ render a full aecountln',! rL'"ardln',! such propcrt\ ").
II. See .Jackson Law Office. P.e. \. (,h~I]'l'cll. Y;- S.\\.3d I~. 22-2.' (Tc\ ..\pp.-T\ icr
20()O. PCI. denied) (hnldin',! th~ll the e\ille'l1cL'. \\ hich sho\\cU amul1',! ,,[her thlll!,!s that the
attornevs were \ <l',!uc rc',!ardin',! their fcc arral1'-'CIllCIlI. \\as sufi'icicnt I" SUPI',)ri the jUr\ \,
findin',!ofhreaehuffiduciar\dut\):\\'>I)jI Ri Ils'>I PRi)I'1 (·')'-.I)I'! R. 1.~(h)(2()()2)
(statin!! that "the basis or rate of the fee and e\I'cl1sCs for \\hich thc (111..'111 \\ill hc respon'iihie shall be communicateu to thc clicnl. prclcral'l\ In \\rJtin',!. hcfnre ,'r \\llhln d rcasol1ahie' time after comlllencing the rcprCsel1L1II"n"!. AccorLiin',! I" Ihe' '\111L'I'ICall 1.,1\\
Institute:
111e hasis or ratc mi',!ht he a spccified hourh char',!c. a percenla',!c. m ,I sct of factors
on which the fcc will be based. If the fec is hased on a percenta',!c 01 rcc()\cn (or
other base). thc client should also hc inforilled If a different perCenL]QC applies in the
cvent of setticment. trial. or appeal. For a client sophisticatcd in rctainln',! law\ers. a
statemcnt that "we will ehlH',!c our usual houri< ratc'," ordinarily \\ ill suffice.

The information shoulu indicate thc matter I'm \\hich the fee will he duc'. for example. "prcparing and trying (but not appealinC') your auto injun suit." II' thc scn iccs
lire not specificallv descrihed. the la\\ \'er \\ill hc held undcr ~ IS 10 I,m\ Ilk the services that a reasonahk client would ha\c L'\I'L'ctcd.
\Iost >tate, rcquire thlll contin',!ent-fce C<lnlracts he In \\
RI\I.\II\II .... I ITllml)) 01· 11I1 Lv<\ (j()\II"-I .... ', 1.\\\'II"~.'SC1l11 10121111111. It hllllportant to fWlL'. h\l\\ 1.'\ er. that the dlscltlsurc "hllQalltlllS f' 'llncnt to c"lltr~ICI Inltlatioil arc
limitcd. II' no pn1fe"il)Jlal rclationship hel\\L'en IhL' ~Iltorne\ ~lIld ciiL'llt (\lstS ,Il lhe tllllC
Ihc agrcelllent is cnterc:d inlo. thc sl, :nQL'l1t ruks ~Ij'I'lic:Jhie 10 hUSitlL'" Ir,lns:Jctlulh bet\\'CCIl altornc\ and clicnt dn not apph. and Ihcref,)rL' Ihc l'ontr~lct " !lot pJ'csulllptl\cl\
frauduknt on thc part of thc 'Ittmnc\. SI'" J"hIH>Il \ ('<)fer. II., S.\\ .2Li lJh.'. 9h:'i (rex.
Ci\. App.-Austll1 19.'S.l1o \Hit) (,;t~llil1',! IILII IhL' ruic \\herc ~11r;lllsdctj('11 ['ct\\ccn 11I\\\'cr
and client \\ill he "slrictl\ scrutil1l/cd" olll< ~Ij'I'liL's .llter ClllllIllCl1l'L'!llc'lll \llihe dttorI1C\·
and cliellt reLilionshlp).
12. SI'(, .lous \. A.utu-O\\ner, IllS. ell .. =,'-,,'-, ,\.\\.2d -1-l.'. -l-l.~ (\liL·h. ('1 \pp. 1979)
(holdin',! that all att,lrne\ hreached applicahk s\;lnlLird of carc \\hcl1 hc f:lIkd 10 Inforlll his
cliel1t of olTers 10 ,;ettie prinr to trial): Ri!'!" \ 11.1111C\ ..""" A.2d :'\,'-:. (of; 11'.1.1<),'-:9) li1oldin',!
that an altorllc\'s failure to COll\C\' each sClliclllenl ofkr to cilento, ill l'erso!l~iI injurY case,
and failure to in\esti',!atc olTer, that \Verc propusc:d constitutcd Illalpracticc): \1<>1)11
Rl I.IS 01 PROI'I CO .... lll' I R. 1.-1 eml. I 12(1I)~) ('iati!l',! that "a Ll\\\er \\Iw recei\e, fmm
opposin',! cOUilsellin offer of setticillent in a CI\ il c"ntn1\ erS\ or a proffered pica har',!ain in
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tions of attorneys should be defined by the reasonable-care
standard of negligence,

II.

OTHER FORMULATIONS OF DISCLOSlJRI

Ol)ll( j\r!o,-:s

The rubric of "absolute and perfect candor" is rooted in the law
of fiduciary duty," In this area of the jurisprudence. American
courts frequently have been moved to invoke the mnst demanding
rhetoric,l-1 perhaps because clients are often at a disadvantage in
terms of expertise, information, or economic power. I ' The soaring
imagery of Justice John B. Winslow of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court is illustrative, He wrote:
Attorneys are ministers of justice as well as courts. ,md justice will
not be contented with half-hearted service on the part or her ministers, nor will she tolerate a bargain counter within her temple. ll' an
attorney purchasers] his client's property, concerning which his advice is sought, the transaction is always viewed with sLlspicion. and
the attorney assumes the heavy burden of proving not only that there

a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its suhstance unk,s" rrim discussions
with the client have left it clear that the prorosal will he unacceptahk).
13. See Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard. P.c.. 73 S.W.3d 193. 199 (rex. 2()02) (discussing the general nature of fiduciarv dutv in a case involving the ()hli~~ltions of associate
attorneys to law firms for which they work). The court wrote:
Fiduciary duties are imposed hv courh on some relationshirs heclu,e of their special
nature .... [lIt "is impossihle to give a definition of the term thdt I, c'()l11prehenSl\C
enough to cover all cases." ... "1(,lcncrallv sreaking, it arplie, Il' :111\ persoil who
occupies a position of reculiar confidence iowards another. It reiLr, 10 1I1lCgnty ~l11d
fidelity. It contemplatcs fair dealing and good faith, rath,'" thdn k~~tl ohligatilll1. ;1\
the hasis of the transaction." Our courts hayc long recogni/ed tlut ,'crLlln fiduCldf\
duties arc owed hy a trustee III a hendician of the trust. an e,CClII<H' 10 the heneficiaries of an estate. and an attorneY to a client.

1£1.
I·t Cf STFI'Hl"~ C'ILU'YS. RI(ill \II()' 01 LV\\,I'R,: PROlll1 \ i ' <II L\\\ .\'11 EIII67 (5th cd. 19(11) (staling "Islome fiducianc's ha\c higher ohligatilln, than ,Hher fiduci~l
ries. and lawyers have among the highest").
15. SCI' ill. (providing three rea,OI1, supporting fiduciary ohltgdtltl!lS). (;ilkr, stalCs:
I('S

At least three reasons support il11p()sll1~ fiduclarv ohligations un cl Icl\\\er alter the
professional relationship is estahlished. First. the client will likeh h~I\l> hegun to dcpend on the attorney's integrity, fairness. superior knowkdge and Judg111ent. Second.
the attorney may have acquired information ahout the client that
c', the allorney an
unfair advantage in negotiations hetween them. Finally. the clicnt \\ til generall, not
be in a rosition where he or she is free to change attorneys. hut will rather he eCOfl()I11ically or psychologically dependent on the attorney's continued representation.

lei.
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was no overreaching of the client. but that the client acted upon the
fullest information and advice as to his rights. 1h

Similarly. Justice Alberto Gonzalez of the Texas Supreme Court
wrote:
In Texas. we hold attorneys to the higJ1est standards of ethical conduct in their dealings with their clients .. " As Justice Cardozo observed. "[a fiduciary] is held to something stricter than the morals of
the market place. Not honesty alone. but the punctilio of an honor
the most sensitive. is then the standard of behavior." Accordingly. a
lmvyer must conduct his or her business with inveterate honesty and
loyalty. always keeping the c1ient's best interest in mind. 17

However. in exploring the meaning of "'absolute and perfect candor"' as a fiduciary concept. it is useful to remember that fiduciary
duty len\' is only one source of the legal principles that govern the
actions of attorneys. Other important sources include tort law and
contract law.l~ The obligations imposed by these various bodies of

16. Young \. \lurphy. <)7 01. W. -196. -197 (Wi,. IC)O.,), TIle court further stated:
In other words. the attorney must prove uherrtlll({ lidcs. or the transaction will be set
aside bv a court of eljuity. These principles are so well established as to need no
citation of authorities. and to the credit of the profession. be it said. it is rarely necessarv to invoke them.

Id. at -IY7 (emphasis added).
17. Lopez \. \Iufiol:. Hockema & Reed. L.1..P .. ::>2 S.W.3d 5.'\7. 566-67 (Tex. ::>0(0)
(Cion/aiel. J. concurring and dissenting) (ljuotin~ \kinhard v. Salmon. Ih-l 0J.E . .'i-l.'\ . .'\-16
(:\.Y. 1<)20)): ICC a/so r\rcher v. Griffith. "YO S.W.~d ;.'-'. 730 (Tex. 1%-1) (expanding on the
allnri1e\-client fiduciarY relationship). The court 'itakd:
The relation het\\c:en an allorne\ and his d[c'nt [s hiehl\ fiduciarY In nature. and their
dealings \Iith each other arc suhject tn thc' ,;[me scr~[tin\. inkndments and imputations as a transaction hetween an ordinan tfLiske ;lnd his c<'SlIIi 1111(' {msl. "'The hUfden of estdhli,h[ng its rerfect fain'c\s. ;ldequac\. and eljuit\. is tl1mwn upon the
attorney.
/d.

Is. Of course, dl,ciplinary ruks aho ,h;II'e the duties of attorne\ \. Scc. c.g.. MOJ)EL
RI II S (II P[{()I'[ ("()'-Ill ( I R. 1.-1 (2002) ht;iling the Ruk for CClilll11L1nICalion). Model
Ruk 1.-+ ,talCs: "(;11.-\ 1;I\\\'er shall . . (.i) Keep the client feasonahIY Informed about the
st;[tlh nlthe matter ... (-+) promptlY cnmr" \\[th ['ca,onahle reque,[s lor information
(h) r\ law\er ,hall cxplain a mallef tu thc' c,knt rea,nnablv necessary to permit the client
to make informed dec[,ions regarding the reprc\c[llaticHl'" Ii/. Hll\\c\cr. such ethics rules
arc intended to protcct the public and do nnt purport to establish the qandard of care for
ci\ il cause'> uf action. 'nlUS, raragraph ::>() of the Preamble w the \Iodcl Rules states:
\'iolation 01 a Ruk ,hould not itSelf give rise to a cause of action against a lawyer nor
should it create al1\ presumption in such a case that a kgal duty has been
breached.
The Ruh:s arc designed to prmide guidance to laWYers and to pro. [de a
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law must. in the end. be consistent or at least reconcilable if lawyers are to be able to determine what i~ required of them when
performing profes~ional duties.
A.

Torr Lmr

Under the law of torts. the ob\ious starting point for thinking
about attorney liability for breach of the duty of candor is the tort
of deceit. l ,! 111 at widely recognized action c" requires proof of a
false or misleading statement or of a failure to disclose information
under circumstances where there is a duty to ~peak.'1 The plaintiff
must also show. typically by more than a mere preponderance of
evidence. 22 that the defendant acted \\ith scienter (that is. knowl-

slruclure lor re~ULllln~, (llneluct
tn he ,I l1a'I' lor CI\II 11.1111111\.

Ihruu~h

dl,cipllllcll"\ .1"c'IlL'le"

rhe\ .Ire

11(H

IJ al Preamhle. rhe Ilurp(he 01 Ihi, <!rilck i, I(l eli,cu" m:ill'r:lclice 11:lhilll\ or :lllllme" III
clienls, ralher Ihan attorne\ disL·lplll1e. ('lln'L'LJuL'l1lh. IhL' Ll\\ "rduorne\ discipline \\ill he
discussed llllh \\ here it is imporlant to dn under,ldndll1" ur ci\ II-liahility principles.
I <). Sec. e,g .. Holland \. Bf(m n, h6 S. W.::'d I ()<)5, II (I.::' (Tex. Ci\. App,-Beaumollt
I<)~~, writ rd'd) (stating the rule that "failure of an allurne\ dealing "ith his cliellt to
discluse to him the material facts and the legal conseLJuences r\o"ing from the facts constitutes actionable fraud"): ct: Thomas \. White, 43S S.E.::'d ,;66, ~6t) (Cia. Ct. App, 19'),;)
(discussing claim hased on fraudulent concealment that client";, clse had heen lost),
20. See VI"'I ,I R. j')II"')'.. 8.: AI \, (,I ' " SII 11I1' I, A\II RI( \, TORI L\\\ 2\~n
(2d cd. 19<)<)) (stating that "Iel\l~n iuri"liction recognl/e' :In action for ',kceit'''): ICC <II\()
W. P,\(II KII I(), I I \1" PI{("'I H 8.: KII I(), ,), T()I{I' -::':-::'S (:'th cd. 19S4) (tracin>2 the
"ancient" ori~in of deceit h:ICK to a \\rit Kn()\\n a, earl\ .1' 1::'(1).
21. Sce hey' \. :\e\land, ::'5 S.\\.2d ,;\.', 31:' (Te\. C()ll1mn .-'-pp. 1<),'(). hl)lding appn)\ed) hlating that "I" Ie thill~ the relilliol1 l)f attorn,'\ .11lL! (11cl1l e\hled and thilt il II:!'>
the duty of thc dttume\, :mel hi, agcnt in c1calll1g IIllh Ihe (lielli. to make a full alld I:m
disc\usure of all material maltcr, KIl()\\1l t" the attornc\ III Cl\llnC(tillll "ilh the st()C~, and
that a failure lU do Vl lIoulel con,titute legiil fraud"): johll'l(1I1 \ Andr:I,ie:, 54 S,\\.::'d 11)::'9,
10-'1 n'c'i, ('1\. App ...-Fort \\'orth 19.'2, IIril reed) (lwldll1>2 all()rnc\ liable to cliellt hased
nl1 failure lu disci'lSe kn(m\cLh.:e "f pendin>2 ncg()liall()lls .Iik(tilh' Ihe \alue uf pr()I'crt\
hClllg ,old): RI 'I \11 \11 ,I lSI «)'..I») <)1 j'(>I{I, ~ 'i'iil I) 11'1-") (,\,Illn" lhL' ruk on klhilit\ fur llolldlsclll'.lHL' I: \\'. I' \'.1 KI I I ()'.. I I \1. PRe " " H ,\: Kl I I ()'.. (,'. T< H' I' 7::'S (.'lh
cd. I'J:-i4) (stalin" lh:lt de(ell rL'ljlllre, "[:lllal,e rcprL"Cl1liill(ln madc h\ the ddend:IIlI"1:
1<'(' Ur'll Arnall, (inlden & (ire"on \
Health Sen. Clr" 111,'" .'()C) S.L::'d 'i6:" -;1>7 (ia.
:\pp. Cl. 19lJO) (llllldin~ in an action h\ iI clielll :lg:IJI1st .1 1.1\\ lirm th:n :1 frillid claim ,,:1\
sutlicient to raise i"ue, or tad e\en though Ihe claim \\:1, ha,>ed on concealment. (l)mpared to aClLlal mis,talCmenh, for "[cloncealmenl per ,e ,'on,titute, actual fraud "here
one party ha, the right III expect full communication of the raclS from another"): Hennl~:ll1
\. Harris County, :'l)~ S.W.2d .'SO. -,:-i~-:-i4 (1"\:\. Ci\. App.- Waco I ()79, writ ret"d n.r.e)
(permitting fraud action b\ third persons hased on attorne\'" failure to disclose that a
judgment had been satisfied).
n. Sec VI,C[,\:I R, j()f{\:S()'. 8.: Al.,"" Cit,\:, SllDIE, I\: AS1Ut!I,\\: TORI LA\\ 8K~
(2d ed. 1')<)<)) (stating that "Ifjraud, it is often said, must be established by 'clear and con-
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edge of the representation's falsity ur reckless disregard for its
truth )2; and intended to induce reliance .'1 However. even then liability will not he imposed unless the misrepresentation was sufficiently trustworth y2' and material-'h that a reasonable person would
\incin~ e\idenee' or h\ a 'clcdr I'reI'OndcLlnl'c' (ll ihc' c\idcncc'···). 11111 I,'," Yeldell \.
(;oren. KO S.W ..'d h.'-\. h:en (ICx. AI'I'.~[)aILls ~IIIC Ill) peL I (Iwklin" that "I,jli~ht circUlllstantidl c\'idenec of fraud. \\hen considered \\1111 Ihc' hreaeh of Jl'rtlnHse tn perfornL i,
sufficient tl) support a findin" or I'rauduk'nt ink'nl")
2.;. See RI Sl \11\11 ,I (SI ({)'-I)I 01 TORIS ~ ':'1· II'nil (dcfinllH' SCienter in sli~hth
different terms): \\'. I'\<d KII "" I I \1 .. PR""I R \,1) KII I'" 'l'- I(\R!\ 7-\1--\2 ('ith
elL 19K-\) (statin~ that "ltJhe intent \\hleh heClll1lc" 11111'(lrtant is Ihc' Il1tent to LiCCc'l\e ..
which has been ~i\ en the name ·scienterIT·
II1I Is I,rc,enl \\ hen the reprcsel1tation is
made without an\ belic!' as to its truth. ur \\itll rec~Ic'" disre~al'd \\hether it bc true ur
falsc"): ICi' (//so Prudenti~d Ins. Co. \ ..klferS(1I1 .\s,,'e .. ,-;96 S.\\.2d l:'h. 16.' (Tex. 199:')
(stating that "laJ statement is not fraudulent unkss Ihe maker Kne\\ it \\as raise \\hen he
made it or made it recklessh' without klHmledge ,)1 thc' Irulh··).
2-+'
Se?ar:'. Rllehuck 8.: Co. \. \!cad()\\s. K-- S.W.2d 2KI. 2K2 (Te?s. 199-\) (pcr
curiam) (re\ersin~ illll~IllCnl heeause? trial court rc'lus,'d IU Includc' "Inknl III l1lisle?ad" in
definitioll of rraud).
25. See VI"I ,I R. J(>lI'''''. \\"11 RI", I'WI' ~~I (~d c:d. I'N')) hLIl 111 \2 that in
part. trust\\orthiness is a prC'clllldltlllll 10 prool ,,( I'c'II.II1Cc'. \\hich Is ~1I1 c'icmelll ()( deceit).
-1l1e? text explains:

l:nlcss the? plaintirf has in ract rdicd upon the ~hserkd misrepre?se?ntation. there is
110 factual conne?etion bClwecn the defendant's e<mcluct ~llld the alk~cd dalllag.es (that
is to sa\'. no factual causation) and. hence. there can he no suit.
If the? falsit\' of the ddcndant's statelllent is nb\ illus 10 the plaintilTs Se?l1SCS at the
tillle it is made (e.g .. thc plaintiff se?es that the 11\),.se has t\\O eyes. l1<1t three? as claimed
b\' the? ddcndant) or could hc disCi)\ered h\ :1 I11c're eurson e?\al11ination. Ihc:re? ma\'
be 110 reliance.

Reli:ll1ce is also nut Pe?rt11llkd II a "danger
on notiCe? that lunher InquirY I, requlre?d

sl~l1dl"

tlr "re?d 11.'-'111" places the? plainliff

Id. at 2:'1. Trust\\onl1ine\\ aho ul1lk'rlie, the s,,<,tlkd "(,'CI"

rcqlllrcll~cni.

Thus:

1l1e? ton aClions inr IlllSrcpresenlalion (includl\l\2 d,'l','II) arc.' Il1Ic'lllkd 10 prokct thc
ri:lht 01 illdi\idual, 10 lkeide intelli~e?l1t" their (\\\1) :111:IlrS based '111:111 assessment 01
re!c\al1t infornutinn. COl1se?quel1li1 1m ,Ill ,lcll(ll1 1\\ Ilc. Ihcrc I11USI he? :1 1~lhc :Isse?rtion that carries \\ith It suificicnt ddinilenc'ss ,i\1e! IrLhl\\orthlnc'ss th:lt it i, likel\' t,)
int'e?ct the plainlin", dc'cision-making procc\\. II is t:-c'ljllentl\ said that Ihe? as,enion
must he lllk' or laci
and not n1c'rc'l\ an "1'1111'\1)
SI'C:<':I,<I ClrCllI11Sl~IiKe?S mel\
JllStil\ re?liance on ~In ()plniol1 ur prc'dicl\(ln. II) \\ hleh C:ISc: ,111 IICl\Il\) 11111\ lic If thai
stale?ment is I11lslt:adillg.
. But. in ~e?l1c'raL nil rclul1cc l11a\ hc 1,1,lcc:d ()\1 'ICltCl11enrs
or pure opinion. The?\ arc mere pe?rsonal \ ie\1S 1\ h :C'h ,In 11()1 11lIsrcl're,ent thc facts
rele\anl \l) the plainlilTs decisl()n-I11:lkin~ process. ,'\cn II' thc\ cspre\\ ~1Il unfa\orablc
conclusion or hlm the? e?\ idcnce? should he? \ le\\ cd.
M at 2-1-6: cf Chenc\ \. Barbel'. 2-\2 S.E.2e! _':'K. :;:,1.) Ilia. Ct. [\pp. 197K) (stating that
"[f]raud cannot consist of mere hroken promises. unfilled predictions or erroneous conjectures as to future cvents").
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have taken it into account in choosing a course of action. Statements that amount to mere puffing or that concern matters logically having no bearing on the client's decision-making process will
not give rise to liability.~7 Presumably, if an attorney tells a client
that the tract of land the client is considering buying is "beautiful."
the utterance will not support an action for deceit even if the attorney in fact thinks that the land is ugly and makes the statement
only out of "courtesy." Thus, even in cases of high culpability (i.e ..
cases where there is clear and convincing e\idence of scienter), the
duty of candor falls short of being "absolute and perfect."
Deceit is not the only tort action bearing upon issues of candor.
Malpractice claims against attorneys by clients are frequently
founded not on intentional or reckless conduct. but upon nothing
worse than mere negligence. In a tort action for professional negligence the legal question is whether the attorney did what an ordinary, reasonable, prudent attorney would have done under the
same or similar circumstances.~s Liability depends not on the dL'fendant lawyer's state of mind (scienter),:CJ but on \vhether the law-

26. See Vincent Robert Johnson, Fralld illld Deceir, [1lc!lIdill)!, Segfig!'lll and flillocelli
/v/isrepreselllillioll ~ 1.(13171, II[ PI RSO'.;AL hH'RY: A, II(,'.;S, DI·F1'.;SLS, D.·\MACFS (19~~)

(defining materialitv). The text states:
Virtually all common law forms of rdid based on misrepresentation require that the
statement relate to a material fact. A material fact is one to which a reasonable: person would give some weight in makin!! a decision: it need not he the sok or predominant factor in the recipient's dccisiun making pruce\\.

*

fd. (citations omitted): Wi' 0/.10 it!.
I.03[ I] (stating th,1l "all aClion Will not lie in the absence of some perversion of material factual data ehar;.:eahle to Ihe defendant").
27. SCI' RISI.,\ II \11" I (SI'()'.;!)) ()I T'JIHS ~ ~-I: LillI. e (l'ni) htating. tlnl hlller,
are not entitled to rdv upon "puffing"): WI' ii/SO Streher I HUlller. _.21 F,,'d 701. 7.2~ 1l.-l1J
(5th Cif. 2(00) (recogni/ll1g that deceptiw trade pr,I,'ll,'e, action C:1!1Il()t he hased ,)n "<l
vague, immeasurable opinion," but holding. that the l';l\c' hdure It "c,luld not he mol','
different"): Douglas I. [kip. l)~7 S,W.:'d ~7'). ~~h (Tc\. I ')l)')) (eitinl! C;lses il1\ oil
"mere" puffin!! and statinl! III an <lClIon <lgain,t a lall firm hl\ed Oil \ iolatioll oi tile <keeptive trade pr<lctices act. rather than deceit. that a !!encr,ti r,'!'rC"l'11LltiOIl that a ,cltlement
agreement wlJuld protect the cllellt's interests was lOO \ ,1~lIC under the facts of the case III
support liabilitv): f'mil('/li/u/ [ill. ((io, ~<)h S.W ..2d at In.' (
lhal I'c'presentatiUlb lilal ,I
"building. was 'superh: 'super fine: and '()Ile of the fillC,l little properties in the Citl uf
Austin'" were "mereil 'puffin{ or llpiniol1, and thlh cmild Il()l Clllhlitute Iraud").
2~. Sec Cosgrove v. (;rimes, 77-1 S.W.2d hh2. hh-l ( Ic\. It):';c)j (,tatllll! that 'ltl lawyer ... is held to the st<lndard ni care \\hich would be c'\c'rCised bl d reas()nahlv prudent
attorne\'. 111e jury mustc\aluate his conduct hased on the Iniurm;[tl()11 the attorne\, has ,it
the time ()f the alleged act \11' negligence").
29. SCI'id. at ohS I indicating that "Itihe standard I' ,in objectivc exercise of professional judgment. not the subjectile belid that his acts arc in good faith").
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yer's conduct measured up to what may reasonably be expected of
a professional in the field of law.'I' If the conduct falls short of
meeting the standard of care. the lawyer will be held liable regardless of what the lawyer thought about the risks or intended."
There is a world of difference between a legal standard that requires "reasonable" disclosure and one that requires "absolute and
perfect candor." By embracing a rule of reasonableness. negligence principles recognize that the complexities and uncertainties
of law practice mandate existence of a scope of action within
which. free from the risk of legal liability. attorneys must be able to
exercise judgment as to how to conduct representation.
The reasonableness standard of negligence law is echoed in various expressions of state law'2 and in the blackletter law of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. which states:
~ ~O.

A Lawyer's Duty to Inform and Consult with a Client
(1) A lawyer must keep a client 1'I.'({.\illluhlr iI/limned about lhe
matter and must consult with a client to a rCilIillluhlc cxtCII{ concerning decisions to be made by the lawyer
(2) A lawyer must promptly comply with a client's rcasollah!c 1"1.'(jlles{s for in/iJrlll{[{ion.

(3) A lawyer must notify a client of decisions to be made by the
client ... and must explain a matter to the extent reasonahlv l1ee('s.wry to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation."

30. Cf iii. at hh..[-h.') (>;tating that ··allowing the: altllrlle:\ tIl ;!';,e:rt hi, >;Uhje:CII\C g\lod
faith. "hcn the: act>; hI.' pursue:s arc unre:asonahle as mC;I>;ured hy the: re:asollahll' compete:nt
practiti()ner standard. cre:atc:s too gre:at a hurde:n for 1\ rllngcd clicnts to mercol1lc··),
.'1. 'lei'. e.g .. Vaughan \. \lcnl\l\e:. 3 Bing. ('-:.( I -1h". I.~~ Eng. Rc'l" -FlO. -lC)~ (IS';')
(h()ldil1", that a defendant could not <\\oid liahilit\ lor ~I lire: lu"t he caused lller(iI h\
sh\ming lhat he: acted ··hona ride to the he:st of his ludgfllc'nt"). This rule is not sp,'ci~lI to
la\\ \e:rs. It applie:s thfllughout the \<1\\ of ne:g.igence. :md h:h he:en followed for decades. if
.'~. SCI', <,g .. ('\1,.13. s. 8: PRI)i. ('.)1l1 ~ hOhS(1ll11
Supp, ~IJ(J~) (SLltill:clh:lt
:lttOrlle:1S arc under a dut\ "Itlo respond prompt II III il·,/IOI/II!>!e sLiIUS Il1ljuirle s <11 clie:llIs
:lIld to ke:ep clients I'('(fSOllllhh /l/lllrll/cd of significant dl'\cl()pJl1e:nls in Illatters \\ith re:~ard
t() which the: att\)fI1e:\ has agrc:ed to prm ide: Ieg:lI '1.'1'\ ICCS'·) (,'mphasis added I.
33. RLS I ,'\ II \1 L, I (Til I RIJ 1 01 I II L L \\\ (jl)\ I ", I " , L \\\ 1 I I" ~ ~() ( ~()(J() 1 (IllI,ILI">;
added). Other prmisiuns In the: Restatcme:nt that Illl"ht not mdinartil hc' dc>;crihe:d as
imposing an obligation of candor ne:\crthe:less hear ul'lln \\ hat Inlorlllatlllil ll1ust h: Clllllmunicate:d til clie:llts. Some: of these pfl)\isions impose seel1llllgl\ clear ohligatlon>;.· For
example:. section 3:-( states in relevant part:

~

.IS. Client-Lavwe:r Fee: Contracts

[Vol. 3.+:7.17
Amplifying the f1exihle nature of the dUly imposed hy these provisions. the commentary to the section sutcs:
The duty includes hoth informing the clicllt l)f ill1f)OrfWIf dCl'c/o/Jin a timely fashion. as \\cll as prmiding a SIIIIIIIWIT n(in/emlli/{ioll to the clicnt at reasonable intervals so thc client may be apprised
of progress in the matter. .. ,

IIlellfs

-Ille appropriate extent of consultation is ihelf a proper subject for
consultation. The client may ask for certain information or may ex-

(II Bdore or \\itllin a re'asonahk tillle afkr
ill repreSelll a client in a Illatter. a 1<I\\\er I/il/Il ('1I1//llll/nici/I" to the eliel1l. in \\rllin;.: \\hen dl'l,licahle ruks SO provide, the hasls or rate nf Ihe (ce. unless the cO!l1l1ll1nlcation is unnecessary for the
cliellt hecause the 1<1\\\er ildS prc\iousl\ represented 111.11 Clle'llt onthc: same basis ()r al
the same rate,
RISI\II\II'I(TIIIR11IlJlIIII L\\\(J'l\II"I'(,L\\\\"',~,;SC21)1)(I}(emphasi';ldded),
SirniLlrh. ,ectioll -+-+ ,Liles:
~

-+-+, Sak¥uardin¥ ;lI1d Se'¥re¥atin¥ Pnlpert\

(2) Lpon recei\in¥ fumb or other property in a pro(c"ional capacity and in which a
client or third person ()\\ns or claims an interest. a 1;I\\\er JIlII\! !,rolllplil' II 0 IifI' Ihe
clielll or third person, 'Ille law\er /JI//SI prt)III[!liI' rend('/' iI titll IlCCOlllllillg rqcarding
,uch propert\' upon request h\' tile client or third person,

RIS I ,\ 11\11' I (TIIIHIl) l)j i III L\\\ C;o\ If< '1'.<, L\\\, I I" ~ -+-+ ( 20()O) (emphasis adde'd),
Comment e to ,e'ction 20 slates:
:\ I;I\\\'er l11u,t llrLiinaril\ re'port I'l'Ompth to the CilCllt ;1 ,,:ttknh:nt offer in a CI\il
action or ;1 proposcd pka hdr~ain in a Criminal prosccutlon, Further discklsure i, re·
quired \\hen a propllscd sellklllCilt is part of an d','.','.rc;':,Iic' sellicnlc'nt in\ol\'in','. claims
of se\e'r,Ji cllcnls,
RISI\II\II'I (lIIIRI11'iI II11 L\\\ (;')\II{'I'(,L\\\\llh~'::I)CI~" c(20()O), Hm\e\cr,
other rclatcd prO\ISI01l\ II11POSC ohligati,Hls Ihat arc nol :lh,,)lute, For example:, section -+h
stales III rcic\:Jllt part:
(2) On request. II 1;1\\\e'r I11Ust ;illu\\ a client or I'llrllle'r ,'IIL'llt to inspect and cops '111\
doclIl11cnt possesscd h\ Ihc' I;\\\\el' rclallll¥ II) Ihc l'c'I'i'c'sCI1LlII1l1l, IIllless \II/J\lallliai

~r()llIlii\ ni\1 {() rcill\(',

(3) l 'nks, ,I cilcilt or 1,lrl11e'r cilClll (onse'nls to 11Il1l-ckll\cT\ or suhstantial ¥rtlunds
CXlst I'or rduslIlg tll maKc deli,,'!'\, <l la\\\cr Illl]',t deli\c'r I,) the clicllt or former clienl.
;It ;111 appropriatc timt: and in an\' t:\t:nr prolllptl\' <lltcr the representation ends, such
oll~inals and copies of other doculllents possessed b\ the lil\\\er relating to the representation as the client or former client n'lIsol1({h/I' lieI'd,),
RI,SI\II\II'1 (TIlIRD) III IIII L\\\ (jO\LR'I'l; L\\\'I.RS ~ -+h (2()()O) (emphasis added),
Anuthcr prO\ision of the Restatement states that Ha lawyer must, , , deal honestly with the
client.·· See RfSr.,\IT\IE'1 (THIRD) OF nil, LAW GO\FR'I,-(; LAWYERS ~ 16(3} (2000)
(emphasis added), But that statement raises as many ljucstions as it answers. for the issue
still remains as to what must be disclosed in order to be honest.
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press the wish not to be consulted about certain decisions. '111e lawvcr
should ordinarii\'. honor such wishes .... To the extent that the
parties have not otherwise agreed. a standard of rl!o.lollilhll!l1l!SS
IInder all [Izl! CirClIlI1S[{fllCI!S deremlines Ilze tlJ7fJro/Jrillle /I/('I/Slire of'
C(}lIslI/rmioll. Reasonableness depends upon such factors as the importance of the information or decision, the extent to which disclosure or consultation has already occurred, the client's sophistication
and interest. and the time and mone\ that reporting or consulting
will consume. So far as consultation ahmIl specific decisions is concerned, the lawver should also consider the room for choice. the ability of the client to shape the decision. and the time Cl\ailable .... The
Icl\vyer may refuse to comply with unreasonable client reljuests for
information.'4

In the medical malpractice field. widespread recognition of the
doctrine of informed consent has increased the disclosure obligations of physicians.'~ A medical professional. absent special circumstances. must disclose all material risks of. and alternati\cs to.
a course of treatment. regardless of \\hat is customary among professionals practicing in the community. '" The informed-consent
doctrine has not yet found equally clear recognition in the legal
malpractice field. although there is good authority that the same
principles apply as readily in law as in medicine.'7 But even an
,'.l, Ric.'> I \ ""I" I (I'll"{I)) 01
COO()) (cll1[1ilaslS added 1.

1111

L\\\

(j()\

I R"I'.(: L \11 'I

II{, ~ ~()

cmts. c <'\: d

3:,. Sec KClCilup I. fi(mard. :i-l3 S.E.2d :'71. ,'-h, ,'SI-S6 ((Ja, Cl. ApI'. 211()O) (r(et)gni/ing Informed-comcnt doctrinc and slllllillari/im" :n ;In appcndl\, thL' lall (lithc lano,,,
\talCs ).

,'6. Set'. <'.l; .. Se,Ht \ 13r:ldlord. 6()6 P.2d ":'-1. ""- IOkL!. 1079) (findin02 tlLlt .. \tlhe
d()c·tnne Imp(),C, ,I dut\ (\11 " phlSiciall Ill' .'>urge()n I,) mlorm d p<ltlcnt 01 hI', ()I,tinlh clnd
thclr attcnd:lnt ri,I,;," I,'-;. SeeRI,1 111\1I"IITIIIRI))(lI 1111 1.\11 (;,,1111.''''' I \\I'III",~2()cml.eI21)1I())
(the Rc',t:lIc'mcnt ,talc',:

Bdore a clicnt '1;'11' a ClllllracL for c\a",plc, Ihe l"I\\cr nrdin;lrIiI should c\plain Its
pnni,ions.
Il)C I.I\\\er ordll1anil must e\pl.lin the pro, .mel C(lIh 01 red"'lIuhil
;I\ailahk :ilterlntl\c'" rile' approprialc' detail de'\'c'nd, (lI) such IdUUI'S :1, the' 11111'«rtdnce ulthc decI'I()I1. h,1\I much allliee the ellellt II 1111 Is. 1111:11 the clielll illl, IIlrc.1cil
ICllrlled and C()llsldel'cci, and thc timc ll\ailahk I,lr cklil'e"rdtllll1l:
let' U/\(I Sierr;! Fria ('orJ), \. D()nald .I. b alh 1'( '. 1,- le.,'d 1-,'. j"lJ-S() I j,t ('ir. \<)<)-; I'n)e Slcrra (()uri e\['LlIned:
[Wlhcn a client seck, achlce from <In Clllorne\, the: ,Ittenne\ ()\\es the client ",I jut\ ()I
lull and lair drsclu"ure ul facts mlll<:rial to the cIIL'Ill\, intcre,ts."1l1IS means th,ll the
allurne\, nlUSlltdl i.,e the elielll of an\' significant kgal risks inlolled in a contemplated
transaction, and must do so in terms sufficienth plain to permit the client to asses:,
hoth the risks and their potc:ntial impact on his situation.
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informed-consent standard requiring disclosure of risks and alternatives in legal representation would be les:-; demanding than an
unrestrained duty of "absolute and perfect candur." 111e informedconsent doctrine as recognized in the medical field is hedged not
only by the requirement of materiality.l;'; but hy exceptions that dispense with disclosure if the information in question is already
known to the patient if an emergency exists. m if revelation would
be detrimental to the best interests of the patient. 19
S,

Contract Lint'

Contract law is concerned mainly with obligations voluntarily assumed. rather than with duties imposed by la\\ in the absence of
consent by the parties.,j() A 1,1\vyer may contr~lCl l() assume obligations greater than those mandated by othemi:-;e applicable tort and

Ii/. (citing Williams v. Elv. 66S :\.E.2d 799. S06 (\Iass. [9%11: ,I. 1)1 IH>I{ \11 L. RII<IIII ,\:
D.\\II) LI·Il\". LUi.·\1 EIIII('i ,,97 (.id l'd. 2()01) (statillg ti1:II'IIf1lorlllL'd Clll1"l'ntJ "t:IIl,
dard has been il1corporall'd in \ariou, conflict of intl'rl'st pr()\ ISlllIl, rl'ljuiring tilat lawvl'r'i
shall not rl'presl'nt clients in situations unll'ss 'l'ach ciil'nt eonseflh after consultatioll' ").
"In principll'. informl'd consent Sl'l'ms likl' an attractive alkrn:lti\c tl) patl'rnalism: in practice it is often difficult to apply." Ii/.
3R. See, c.g.. Scott v. Bradford. 606 P.2d SS-+' SS7-SS (Okl:1 I')~'» (dl'scribing disclosure of material risks in the medical field). According to thl' court

[A I physician's cOllllllunications must hl' ml'asurcd by hi, 1';ilICllt'<.; Ill'ed to k!l(m
enoug.h to enable him to make all intl'lIig.ent ciwice. In uthel' \\\lIC\<;. full disclosure of
all m{/fcrial risks incident to trcatnll'nt must bl' made. Therc I' nl) bright line sl'parat,
ing the matl'rial from the immaterial: it is a qUl'stioll of 1:lcl .. \ rhf: is material II it
would be likely to alll'ct patiellt\' dcci,ioll. WIll'n lloll-di,cllhlJrc' <>1 a particular risk i,
open to debate. the issue is fllr thl' filllkr of facts.
Itf. at :'iSR.

:>9. See Scnlr. h()6 P.2J :It :;:'S (ddin
'!lle court wrotl':
ITlherl' arc l'XCepliOns crl'attnC' a 1'1'1\ Ill'ge III a phYSIClall lJllI I, \ ,hclo,c. '1l1Crl' i, 110
Ill'ed to disclose risks that clthl'r (lu,:,ht to he knowil h\ l'\c'I'\llIL' \'1' ,Ire dll'l'acl\ kllll\\ll
to thl' patient. Further. thl' 1'1'1111:11'\ dut\ of a phYsiCian 1'1\\ ,I" \\Iut 1\ hcst lor hi,
patil'nt and \\hel'l' lull disclll\LIrl' \\l)uld be dctnml'lltal tl' ·1 [',llii'IlI', loul c:\rl' ;lllci
hl'st imerl'sts a pll\siclan Illa\ \\Ithhold ,uch discio,urc. 1(\1' C\:II11l'k, \\l1l'l'e dlsclo\ul'c
would alarm an 1'Illotion:tll\ ul',ct 01' apl'rchl'llsi\l' patlellt (,'1"1,111111 to\). IIhc'l'l' thl'rc
is all elllcrgencY' and the P;llil'llt is 111 nil condition to lklCrlllllh: ["I' hlfllSl'l1 whethcr
trcdtllll'nt should bc adminisll'red. thc pri\ill'!"c lllay be in\[lf:c'd
Id. at S"S.
-Il). See Rm Ryden Anderson & Waltl'r W. Steck. Jr .. FitfuI'iun Dill\'. l,lI'I iflld COIl(/'{ICI: A Primer Oil Ihe Legal Jlai{JUlclicc PII~~le_ -17 S\!l' L.. RI \. 2.i:'. 2-16 (1l)9-1) (noting
that "[tJhe essence of an action fur breach of contract is violation 1)1 :111 ohligation assumed
hI consent").

2003]

"ABSOLUTE AND PERFECT CiLVDOR" TO CLIENTS 751

fiduciary duty principles. and failure to meet such obligations will
give rise to a malpractice claim framed as a breach of contract.-+ 1
Conversely. contract law may be used to waive legal protection
that would otherwise be available. Thus. a legally enforceable
waiver of rights by the plaintiff. such as a signed document assuming risks. can insulate the defendant from at least some types of
liability.-+:> Of course. whether a \\aiver is valid is often the crucial
Ljuestion. Waivers that are insufficiently specific to cover the underlying facts-+' or contrary to public policy-+~ afford a defendant no
protection. Thus. if a law firm seeking to rely on a client's release
fails to rebut the unfairness or invalidity associated with a contract
between a Ia\vyer and client. the release will be held invalid.'~
With respect to malpractice liability and the obligations imposed
on attorneys by fiduciary duty principles. a key issue is whether a
lawyer and client may vary the terms of the relationship. That is.
can the Ic1\vyer and client determine what types of information
must be communicated to the client and what need not be disclosed? If so.-+I> the law of contracts imposes an important limitation on the requirements of "'absolute and perfect candor."

*

..( I. SCI' Rf\ I \ 11\11'- I (Till RIl) OF II1I L \\\ (j, l\ I P '-I '-(, L\\\ 'II R -.;
19 cm1. e (~()OO)
(indicating that ;In appropriately structured COlli 1';),'1 to increase a lawyer's dUlies will he
held \alid).

"(:'. For e\dJllpk. \OI11C iurisdictiun\ hold tll,lI \\;Ii\ers "I' li;lhilit\ arc not "did "ith
rc'spect to c'ondlll't more egregiou\ than mere' 11c'~h2c'lll'l' 'li'I', ,'. l{.. /11 !'e Paciric Ad\ entur..:s, Inc..:'7 F. Slipp. 2d 12:',\ 12::':; (D. I-Lill. Il)l)S) Ihnlding that a release of liability ror
groso, negligence \iolated public polie\ ': (jro" \. S\\..:e1. ..(O() '-:.E.::'d :106, :lOS ('-:.1'. I ln9)
(holding that "[t[,) the extent that :l,Qreel11enh purport to grant exemption for liahilitv for
willful ur gro\Sh negligent act') the\ ha\e b":c'l1 \Ielled as \\hull\' void"),
..(.i. S"I' (j/'ll\\. ,,(Oil '-:.E.~d at ,'II (lwldll1C:;1 rl'k:N' Irolll Ilahilit\ il1\alid hecau\e "111stead uf \P'Xil\II1" to prospeclI\e \tudents tl1;l1 the\ \\()uld h;l\e to ahide am con\,'ljuel1c..:s
;lllrihUldbk to thc' instructor's own L:lrek"nc'''. th,' ddendant seeills to ha\e prekrred the
lhc' or opaquc' lL'rlllin()log\ "1.

..(..(. Sec, ('.~ .. run"l \. Regenls of l·ni\. of (','/11 ...is_' !)~d ,,(,,(1. "(-f-f-"(:; (Cill. I%,i)
(lhcllssing factors hl':lring upon whether an ;lgreel11ent will he \oid as against puhlic
polic\),

..(:;, ,';cc Ked.:, \lahin 8: Cate \. '-:;1['1
:'O()O) (holding rekase in\alid).
,,(6. SCI'

Pan IV-£: inti-a.

l'lllllil

Fire In\. Co ..

~O

S.W.3d 69::', h99 (lex.
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Reconciling (he Srandard of Care

According to some observers, malpractice claims based on
breach of fiduciary duty are increasingly common.-17 To the extent
that is true, it is important to reconcile the expansive rhetoric often
found in fiduciary duty cases with the more-precise and better-developed principles that have evolved in the fields of torts and contracts. Otherwise, there is a serious risk that application of
fiduciary duty principles will undermine the important considerations of public policy that have shaped the law of deceit. negligence, and freedom to contract. To put the point somewhat
differently, it makes no sense to say that negligence principles allow lawyers to exercise discretion on debatable questions. or that
contract len\' permits a lavvyer and client to tailor the disclosure obligations in a relationship. if the standard of care in a malpractice
action is defined solely by reference t ) the law of fiduciary duty
requiring "absolute and perfect candor." Consequently. fiduciary
duty may be properly understood only in a broader context that
includes the expectations and requirements that arise from basic
tort and contract principles.-l S

-17, See gCl/erafh \kredith 1, Duncan. Legaf J/aff)l'{ICUC(, fn ;\1/\' Olher 'vllllle: IV/n' {!
Breach o(Fii/{(cial'\' D{(lI Clailll Doc,l 'vOl Silieff ILl SIlI'(,I, 3-1 W,\"I F< )RI,I L. RL\, II.i7,
1137 (1999) (stating that "[iJn a recent trend, court, 11;I\c hccn pcrmitting di,grulltkd cli·
Cllts to hring hreach olliciucian dut\ claims against their ;lltnr11c\,"): LlI\fencc J, Lattn,
The ReS{({I(,llIelll of l!i" L{/I\' GOI'cmillg f.awI'en: :1 \i(II' 11'11111 rlie TreIlC/WI, 2h H( JI ,I!( \
L. RI \, h97, 7-12 (19<)S) (asserting that "[hJreacl1e, olliduclan ohligation, ;lrc inLrc;hingh
the hasi, lor thc' ci\illi:lhilit\ of la\\\ers and la\\ liJ'll1<'I: Sle\e \lc('ollilico c\: R<lh\ n Ihlc"
10\\, 'lllllllllillT O(RC(,!'III f)clcfojJlIll'lIll ill 7/'xm t"~i/f \/uff"'(IOi('<' I_i/II'_ .'.' SI, \1 \",', L .. I.
h(P, h25 (2()()2) (\latlllg that fcc fmfciture claillls h;lse'd nil hre:lch nl liduci:lr\ dUll :ll'c'
being pled more freljuelltl\),
-IS, -lllc'l'C is a Illatlc'r <If ciassificatlnn that dc"c'I'\,'\ ,Ollle atkllli<lll, The RI ,Sl III
111'1 (SI «>'-1)) (II TIll'I' tnnk thc' pl)sition that hre;!c'h o!liduCI:lrI dut\' is;l t(lrt, \<'e
RI\I \11\11'1 (Sll<)'!)) 1)1 T()!(I\ <S7-1 Clllt, h 11')-"II\Lllllh' th,11 "[:d liJuCI;lrI \\!W
COllllllil\ d hre;lch of hIS dut\' as a liduclan is guilt\ ill IIIr1i(lLh c()llduCI tn Ihe I'ersoll lor
II/Hlill hc' \hlluld :ICt"), (Jthe'r ,ourcc, hale c'c/wed tlLiI c':IIc'LC<Ii"I/,11i(1I1 ,')<'e, e,,,, \!creclltll
.I, Duncall, /.ei.;lIf t/<lil'l"ll<lil'l' hI' :1111' ()Ilier ,\UIllI': \\'/'1 (/ firl'lI('1i III fidliClIIl'\ f)lin (/<1/11/
[Joo SOl SIll!'ff 11,1 SIII'('I, ,,-I \\' \,,1 F<wl sl L. RI \.11.'-,11.(;': (1<)i)()1 (statiml tildl hC;lch
lliliducian dut\ is a illrtl. While it is true that an actinll luI' hl'c'acll ()lliLiucian dut\ Is d
tnrt actiun in the sen,e Ilut It pnl\ide, a ci\il remecl\ for ddllwges Ilot \;:hed on contraCI. It
is u,du/t(J rememhcr that the action is hased mainil on principles dtlle la\\ of agency, In
tll:!t ,ense, the actilln is animated hI' a source olla\\ distinct frolll the law of torts. and it i'i
therefore appropriatc to draw a distinctillll, Ordinan tort principle, ,(1\ little ahout liduci·
;Iri<:\: <he principle, of agency ,ay a great deal. An altorllC\ ,ecking !!uiciance ahout his or
her fiduciary ohligatiolls i, hettcr ad\ ised to turn to the Re\talcmeJlt of Agencv than to the
Rest akmcnt of Ton" SCi' ;,;<'Ill'mfh Rm R\'llen Amlc'!',oll 8: Walter W, Skelc, .J 1' .. Fir/WI'

"AHSCnCTI: ;ISf)

::O()3/
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A line of cleven Texas cases. many of them quite recent. it1\oke
the phrase "absolute and perfect candor" to describe the obligations of an attorney to a client. That series of decisiuns began more
than a quarter of a century ago \\ith a disbarment proceeding in
I){(/{(' \, B{/ker,~'i The defendant att,)rney was charged \\ith violatIng \arious rules of ethics by purclLlSing property at a sheriff's sale.
~J1Ie"edh. on behalf of his client. and then Ltsin~ the title to secure
further compensation for himself from a third party. without notice
\l) ,)J" consent by his c1ient."11 In discLissing the undisclosed purchase
Jild a related settlement agreement. the court \\ rote. citing to
.)midl \, /)COII."I that ··[tJhe relationship between attorney and client has heen held to be one of ll/Jarilll([ fides," , Theil. \\ith citati(Hl only to Rlock'" Lmt' DicriOlwn." the court explained "'[t]his
ha-; heen described as: 'The most ahundant good Llith: absolute
,llld perfeci candor or openness and honesty: the absl'nce of any
c()llcealment or deception. howeyer slight.' " " I Thus. it was vvith
the talismanic invocation of a Latin term and a definition from a
~

~

nlln, f;;n IInr! COI/{rtlo: A Prilller nil {Ii,' !.,'~(/I \/(//I'mcri,'<' 1'/1 ..-/,' ·r S\It· L. RI \
';.;. ~;.; 11\)\/-11 I,h,erlill\!. there <lrt: "[tjllrel' dl'IIIlCI cau'e' of aCI«)J1
,l\lll[;lhic to elleill,

,/1 \

;'Ir

Illl,bclLI\I<lI' hi lheir 1,1\\ler,: (I) hrellcil ()I liclucurl dUll. 1~II'rcllcil ,'(,'<1I][I'<H.:t: lilld

,; 1 lil,' !t1l'1 11I1llItipra,'IICl''') .

:',--'r

.~(;;

-;.\\,2d

.1'1

';;'1

'II

"i,lie' \

ITe\. Cil

Bd~'T ';3<)

S.\\',::'d

:\[11'..~h7 .

.'h'l

'\U'111l I')~h. \\ril (','I'd 111',' I II'cr CUrI,lllll.

(1,'\, (',\

\1'1'",·,,'\U'llll 1'1-'" \\rll rei'd l1.r.(.1

,-'LJ rLi 111 ),

'I

~.lll

.;~.

/)(!~,('f" . .::.~\)

-~t)

I re\. (·il. "\1'1'.-,\\.1(" I<I'! 11<\ 111'111
fn .\Illlfl!. Ih,-' \..'tlllrl;" 'j('l'k'd.lll clLhcf",-' l'\h"ll''') .... iolll'\~!illl
,,,,\',,1 h ,Iil ,llldrll,'I. SlIItlli. ::'·W S.W.:\I ill -'II
ill,' III I (lrJh.'\ Iud LI~ell cildL.'e '\(pmi'".1,\1 h\ . . '-\1]1J\.'II: :j .... ~ltlornl-·: dlllllr 11 <.;!t..'\..-' (ur ,Ill L',LllL' ,!!ll! 1h.' \ 1..-'1" ~,!\L' l'h)l!l'\..' ll) an~ or till.'
"'\1,1111" 111.11 he' \\Ih ciail1lill;l the prol,erll ,1,iI,'r,,'11 III lh,'m, ,\1'(' 11/ Iii "'ill 1,'\ldhllsil'ill' !.Jl'itLiI h,h:k~r\lllfld of rl1,--' l':l">l.'j,
niL' ,,'llurL
,in:2 \...',II"!I-...'r ,j,--'~'h!\jih. ",lid 111;!t tbL'
<:(11l"i1ii"\ ,1) .!ll\ll"ll\...'\ ;llld dk'lll h {{h(T!"!;!',1 ',/('\. I'Ll( clHJ 11\1[
Jih.' ),hi"!'>l' ",th\(\iU1L'
'i \\,2d

\

\\'.~d ,It .~~-L

\\!~ll'l; ;;,\..'d tlh.: ILT111 "/{/II'fT/fllU

fidr'\" 1:1 I
l'{lU;"'\..-' (ll "L:!I
111.]; ",U'-,I)ll"'''''' lr;IIl'<IC.lnd client ,Ir....: !"lrl.'"UiHI'\j\I.'!\ ir.1LldukT1L I~ul :I:lh~ (:1'''-' .... <Ihn did
i'c :h,' 1'11I,(\c' ",d',,,luk lind PC:l'icCI ,'IIIl,Ie,r'
),' /J <II -lil 1(11
Ikll I Rdll1lrc/.
"I" \\ i'" /;.'~ 11,'s, ell, AI'P,-~..\lIqli1 1-1.:'-. \\I'it rd'c! 11.1',,',1: .I,)illh"ll I. (·Ilkr. II.,
, \\ .~,:lll; 'Ill.' lies. (·jl. r\pp.-~r\uslin I q,~. ll\\ \1 I'll!: lind Himel I l.d\(I\eK. 1)-1 'i.\\.2d
"
i 1,1/ I ks, ('II App.-Te\arkanll I').~h. 1\('11 dhl1l·d)).
"
III \, ,,', l. \II DI( II< 1'- IRI Ihi){) I~th Cll. 1'i,';II,
:1'"

\\,,',,'11 .1:[\lfT1L'!

,~

/{iI!\lT, 5"~1} S.\\·.~d ,It _~'7-L
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dictionary that the Texas line of cases on "absolute and perfect candor" began.
Black's Lenv Dictionary cites only one source in support of the
quoted definition-the commentary of Justice Joseph Story.~' In
his work on Equity Jurisprudcncc. Story proclaimed in sweeping
terms:
!T]he burden of establishing, , , [the] perfect fairness. adclju<lcy. and
equity [of a transaction between lawyer and client] is thnmn upon
the attorney. upon the general rule. that he who [has] bargain[ed] in
a matter of advantage with a person. placing a confidencc in him. is
bound to show that a reasonable use has been made ur tll;![ confidence: a rule applying equally to all persons standing in confidential
relations with each other. If no such proof is established. courts of
equity treat the cases as one of constructive fraud.'h

However, Story was discussing only "contracts and transactions"
between client and lawyer'7 and situations where "the latter ...
[might derive] ... benefit ... from the contracts. or bounty. or
other negotiations of the former. "'s In such instances. the interests
of the attorney and client are adverse and there are risks of "mischief, which may be brought about by means, secret and inaccessible to judicial scrutiny, from the dangerous intluences arising from
the confidential relation of the parties."''! In that context. it is easy
to understand the need to hold the attorney to a high standard that
affords maximum protection to client interests. HO\\cver. what
Story would have said about an attorney's duty to disclose information to clients in other contexts is a matter of conjecture, So too.
whether the Baker court would have found the same quotati("1
from Black's Lmi' Dictionar:,; appropriate in a malpract ice. rather
than disciplinary context. or in a case not involving benefit to the
attorney. is speculative,
The second Texas decision stating that attorneys han: a duty of
"ahsolute and perfect candor" was Hetiler r, S{(l{C."'1 a case which
affirmed the criminal conviction of an attornev for theft of client

~S. BI,\C"K's LAW DICtl!),,\R'! 16110 (-+th cd. IllSI),
'ih. I J'1SU'lt SI()ln. CO,t\ll ..... ,.\'W S 1"- [ ' ) ! II Y
lil77).
'i7. Id. ~ 310.
~iI,

J!RI'iI'I{! 111 .... , !

frl.

'ill. Id.
60. 7.1" S.W.2d 60il (TeX. App.-Dallas 1()il7. pel. reed).

~

.'It (12th cd.
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funds. 6 ! The attorney had argued that the trial court erred in failing to give a mistake-of-fact instruction,6~ The appellate court rejected this contention on several grounds. including that the
attorney lacked a reasonable belief that the client had understood
and approved the transfer of funds into the attorney's operating
account. hJ The court declared. with citation to Smith. that the relationship between attorney and client is uberrima fides,()~ It then
quoted the definition of that term from Black's Lmt' Dictionary.
but it cited that language only to Baker.()~ The court concluded
that an ordinary. prudent man acting in a fiduciary relationship
could not have reasonably believed that the client had consented to
the transfer of the funds because the facts showed that the attorney-defendant was aware that the client had "been admitted to
psychiatric hospitals on at least six occasions" and "was taking
medication. ,,(,() Because of its unusual criminal-law posture. Hefner
offers no guidance as to how far the disclosure obligations of attorneys extend for purposes of civil liability.
The third Texas case using the phrase "absolute and perfect candor," Resolution Trust Corp, v. H-, p, C.. h7 is more instructive. In
Resolution Trust Corp., the federal district court held that the entire contents of an attorney's client file belongs to the client and
must be returned to the client upon demand. 6 ?l The court declined
to endorse the law firm's arguments that the duty was limited to
materials that the client had previously given to the firm. and that
therefore documents created by the firm were not client property
for purposes of the obligation to deliver them upon request. 69 In

61. Hefner v. State, 735 S.W.2d 601l, 627 (Ie,,\. Apr.-Dallas I'JIl:. pel. rcr·d).

62. See id. at 610 (asserting the fourteen POlllt;, of error on appeal I.
63. Sec id. at 623 (noting the appellate court";, opinion of Hefner's claim that the client
understood and approved the transfers).
64. See it!. at 624 (citing Smith v. Dean. 24() S.W.2d 71ltJ. 7tJl (Tex. ('iv. App.-Waco
ItJ:'i1. no writ) and suggesting that Hefner \\ d' III a fiduciary relationship with the
complainant ).
65. See id. (eiling State v. Baker. :'i39 S.\\.~d :"h7 . .,74 n~\ ('1\ /\pp-~AlIstin ItJ76.
writ reCd n.r.c.) (pcr curiam) (suggesting wIn lktncr \V;1:, nol cntltled to mi;,take of fact
defense ).
66. Hefner, T\5 S.W.2d at 624.
67. 121l F.R.D. 647 (N.D. Tex. 19/-jtJ).
68. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. H-. p.e .. 12/-j F.R.D. 647. 650 (N.D. l"\;x. 1911tJ)
(summarizing the court's decision that a lawyer's client file helongs to the client. not the
lawyer).
69. fd. at 648.
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also rejecting the firm's contention that the "universal practice"7il
of delivering the entire file applied only "when the file is to be
turned over to another attorney and not to the clienL"7 1 the court
quoted the "absolute and perfect candor" statement from Baker.72
It concluded:
Defendant's argument boils down to a helief that only another lawyer can be trusted with the file. This arg.ument cannot he taken seriously, since it would fundamentally unJermin(' the open and trusting
nature of the attorn('y-client rdationship hy building a wall he tween
the client and attorney behind which an altorn('y could protect himself and his dealings from scrutiny.7,

The court also expressly repudiated the firm's argument that because the case involved allegations of misconduct by the client
against the firm, the firm had a right to retain the files in anticipation of litigation.7-! It wrote: "SO long as an attorney represents his
client. he owes that client a fiduciatT dill" ro disc/ose all information to the client. "7'; As such, the ruling III Reso/lifioll Trust Corp.
was broad.
During the decade subsequent to Reso/ution Trust Corp., the
American Law Institute crafted the Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers. The Restatement, by embracing a more
nuanced approach, calls Resolution Trust Corp. 's holding into question. According to the Restatement:
A lawyer may refuse to disclose to the client certain law-firm documents reasonably intended only for internal r('view, such as a memorandum discussing which lawyers in the firm should be assigned to a
case, whether a la\.vyer must withdra\\ hec~lUSC of the client's misconduct. or the firm's possible malpractice liahtlity to the client. The
need for law:wrs to be able to set down their thoug.hts privately in
order to assure effective and 8opropriate representation warrants
keeping such documents secret from the client involved. 7 ()

70. Id.
71. Id
72. fd. at 6.+9 (qll()till~ Stale \. Bakcr. .".i9 S.\\' ..2d
I 97(), ""Tit rd\j n.r.c.) (per curiam)).
Resoilition hU.II ( orp., 12;.\ F.RD. at 6'+(),

.~h-; .

.i74 (ICx. Ci\. Apl'.--Alhtin

n.

7'+. /d
75. fd. (cmphasis addcd).
76. RrsTAIF\II:\T (THIRD) OF rIll. LAW (j(J\IR:\I:\(; L\wYI RS ~.+o cml. c (2(JOO).
Note, howcver, that immcdiately following the quotation set forth in the text, thc commcnt
goes on to state: "Even in sllch circumstances. hOWC\CL a tribunal may properly ordcr
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Arguably, in light of these developments. the disclosure obligation recognized by Resolution Tnts( COIp. should be understood to
apply only when information contained in the client's file was not
prepared for internal law firm purposes. Thus limited. the duty
recognized by Resolution Trust Corp. would be considerably more
precise and circumscribed than a broadly worded duty of "absolute
and perfect candor."
Pere:: v. Kirk & Carrigan. the fourth Texas case referring to
"absolute and perfect candor" provides no guidance on the disclosure obligations of attorneys.7K 1l1at malpractice action focused
not on what attorneys must tell their clients. but on whether liability may be imposed for improper disclosure of client information to
third parties. 7 ') Ouotation of the "ahsolute and perfect candor"
and "lIherima fides" language and citations to the earlier Hefner
and Baker decisions served merely as a preface to the court's recognition that "because of the openness and candor within this relationship. certain communications bel\\een attorney and client are
privileged from disclosure. ",,() The COLlrt held that the defendant's
disclosure of a client's statement to the district attorney could give
rise to civil liability.,,1
The fifth Texas case invoking the language of "absolute and perfect candor" was Soliman v. Golt;:.:':' Ironically. this unpublished
decision is one of the most useful for understanding that there are
limits of the disclosure obligations of attorneys. Soliman. the client. sued Goltz, the attorney. alleging. in part that Goltz had
breached his fiduciary duty by hiring his (Goltz's) daughter to assist in Soliman's suit against a third part:- withollt revealing that the

,heme'!'\' or th~ d()cul11~nt wh~n discmer\' rules ", I'ldl Ide. rhe 1<1II\er\ dutl to Inrorm
lile client ... can require the lawver to disclose n];lller, ,ihcussed In a doculllcnt ~I~n when
the document ihelr need not he disclosed." Id.
77 S~':: S.\\..:'d .2h I (Tex. App.-Corpus (,IHIstl I')'! I. IHit denied)
7S. P~re/ I. Kirk 8: Carrigan. S22 S.W.2d 2hl. 2h" (res. API'.--Cml'us Christi 1991.
\\ rit

denl~d).

79. 1'<'1'''::'. S~2 S.\\' . .2d at ~6'i-66 (explaining lilat the clienl\; attol'lleY disclosed conri-

,ientlal cOl11munications to the district attornel).
SI) Id. at 26'i .

.'\ I. Id. at 266-67.
S2.
l!lot

"0.

O'i-93-()()()()S-CV. 19l)3 WL .+027.+0 (I\:x. App.-Dallas Oct. h. 199J. no writ)
for puhlication).

dL'slgnal~d
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daughter was on social terms with a co-defendant's attorney:'" Essentially, the argument was that the social relationship gave rise to
a conflict of interest that prejudiced Goltz and required disclosure.i)4 There was evidence that Goltz's daughter'S assistance consisted simply of filing several papers for Goltz,'" After quoting the
oft-cited language from Baker that a lawyer owes a client "the most
abundant good faith, absolute and perfect candor or openness. and
the absence of any concealment or deception. however slight." the
court went on to write:
While the scope of a confidential relationship is broad. the Texas Supreme Court has placed certain general limitations upon the breadth
of a fiduciary's duty. The Court has recognized that the fiduciary
duties extend only to dealings within the scope of the underlying relationship of the parties. Soliman argues that Goltz's fiduciary duty
included an obligation to inform him thaI Goltz's daughter was dating the Prufrock attorney. We do not agree. Soliman has not ciled,
nor have we discovered. any authority holding that socializing between attorneys for adverse parties breaches a fiduciary duty. Nor
did he allege any facts in his pleadings. summary judgment response
or summary judgment evidence which persuade us that Goltz
breached a fiduciary duty. We conclude that any obligation to apprise Soliman of such a situation was outside the scope of the fiduciary relationship established by their attorney-client employment
relationship. We hold that the trial court correctly ruled that there
was no legal basis for Soliman's breach of fiduciary duty claim. H()

The Rankin v. Naftalis H7 decision cited in Soliman had involved
fiduciary obligations among joint venturers. rather than fiduciary
duties owed by attorney to c1ient.s.~ However. as discussed below.~<)
the principle that fiduciary duties extend no f~)rther than the scope
of the fiduciary relationship is well established in the attorney-client context. It is therefore not surprising that the Soliman court
relied upon the rule. What is surprising. perhaps. is the court's application of the rule to the facts of the case. The relationship be-

83. Soliman v. (joltz. ;-";0. 05-'!3-000()I-I-CV. Il!'):; \\ L -W27'+0. at
las Oct. 6. 1993. no writ) (not designated for pllhlic~lli()f1).
1-1'+. Id. at *9.

1-2 (reX :\pp.-Dal-

85. !d.

86. Id. (citing Rankin v. Naftalis. 557 S.W.2d 9'+0. 9.+.+ (Tex. 1977)).

1-17. 557 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1977).
1-11-\. Rankin. 557 S.W.2d at 944.
89. See Part IV -A infra.
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tween the defendant attorney's daughter/employee and opposing
counsel was not clearly a matter wholly extraneous to the subject
matter of the representation. Some persons \\ould argue that the
lawsuit was the subject matter of the representation and whether
the attorney or his daughter/employee's conduct created a conflict
of interest was highly relevant. On such matters. reasonable minds
may differ as to where the line should be drawn with respect to
disclosure. YO What is important for present purposes is to note that
the Dallas Court of Appeals. after imoking the "absolute and perfect candor rule." proceeded to countenance nondisclosure of information which the client. quite plausibly. would like to have
known.
In re Legal Econometrics. Inc ..cJl the sixth Texas case in the line
of decisions referring to a duty of "ah:-;olute and perfect candor."
was the first in which a breach of the fiduciary duty to disclose gave

90. Sec Rice \. Pl'ri. 3~() :\.W.2d ,W7. ,W7. -III I \lillil. IlJS~) (Iwlding that a la\\ flJ"lll
and attorney "were under an obligation to disclosc' t,," a client existence of their relation·
ship with claims adjuster whn settled the client's clall11I, 11le Riel' court Slated: "111e exis·
tence of the 'husiness relationship' created. at the \en least. a substantial appearance of
impropriety with respect to Perl. and a serious connict l)i interest for Browne. A reasona·
ble client would certainly wish to know. and has a rlgllt to this information. before pro·
ceeding with settlement negotiations." Id. at -III. Relatr:d issues have arisen in other
contexts. In People L Jackson. the court ()\erturned :1 Cl\n\ iniol1 hased on ineffective assis·
tance of counsel where neither the defendant or 11IdC'e were informed that the defense
counsel and prosccutor were dating. Pcople \. Jacksllil. ~L, Cal. Rptr. 521. 521-22 (Cal. Ct.
App. 19:-\5). California disciplinarY rules now requlrc';1 1:I\\\'er t" reveal (he facts if another
party's lawyer is a close relati\e or. hes with. or 11:IS ",111 inlimate personal relatiol1'iilip"
with. the lawver. C\ 1.1 I . RII Is (\1 PR()I. CO .... I)I ( I R,'·"'~() (\\'est 2(02). 111e \Iockl
Rules of Professional Conduct do not direct" ,Idclrl''' ,'cLltl()nships such as dating, :11thoug.h a comment to the general connict of il1krL'sl rule 1,1'(1\ Id,'s:

When lawvers representing different clients In thL' ',Ill),' nl:ltlc'r or ill substantial" re·
lated malters arc closc'" related hv hlood ,\r l11aITl,lcc·. Ih"I'C l11a\ be a significant risk
that client confidenccs will he re\ealed and thai Illc 1,I\\\c'I'\ lalllily relationship will
interfere with hoth I,,\alt\ and independent pn\k"llll1;11 jlld"I11l'l1t, As a result. each
client is cnti(led to krl\l\\' "ithe e\i';[cncc and
.111<\11' "itlll' rL'Lltinnship helllccl1
Ihe law\'ers hclorc thc' lall\er ;1"re(S III lIndert,I~(' 'he' I'L'!'rcsc·I1l:illllll. Thus. a [;]I\,\cr
related to another la\I\l'r. e.",. as p:lr,·ll1. child. sll,II!1" ,\1' si'''lh . :. l)rdinarilv 111:1\, IWI
represent a client ill :l l11;llter whcre that l:ll\\cr Is r,'I"','SCI1III1" ;111,Hher partv. link,s
each client gi\l.~s mforrned con:-.ent.
\J()DI[ R!LLS 01 PROI'I CO .... I)I( I R. 1.7 crnL II I~IJIJ~I (C:1111,i1:ISI' added).
91. 191 B.R. 3:')1 (Bankr. ~.D. Tex. 199'i). alfd ill parr al/(I ,acaled ill parr SIIh. nom
Vaughn \. Atkin. No. :').9'i·CV·()-+'i7-R. 1997 WI. :,('Ohl; (:\.1) Tex. Aug. 29.19(7) (mem.).
appeal after rel/land. No. CA -":lJS·CV-2297-R. 19l)lJ Wl. .'O-l'i64 (N.D. Tex. May 11. 1999)
(mel11. and order).
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rise to civil liability.C):' There, a law firm implemented a restructuring plan that gave a third-party trustee effective control over a
debtor's businesses without disclosing the firm's own prior. close
relationship with the third party.'); After noting the requirement of
"absolute and perfect candor." the court concluded, \vithout discussion, that the defendants breached this duty by their acts.')4
However. the court also found, earlier in the opinion, that the same
conduct also constituted negligence')' and gross negligence.% Consequently, the case can be read to mean simply that negligent nondisclosure of material information is a breach uf fiduciary duty. It
is impossible to discern whether. in the \ie\\ of the court. the "absolute and perfect candor" requirement could gi\e rise to liability
in a case involving a nonnegligent (i.e .. re~lS()!1able, rather than unreasonable) failure to disclose information. That. of course, is a
critical question: Does the "absolute and perfect candor" standard
require an attorney to do more than act 1'\ ;'qmahly in communicating with a client?
The language of "absolute and perfect candor" has ne\er appeared in a majority opinion of the Texas Supreme Court. However, on two occasions the phrase has been mentioned as part of
other high court opinions, namely in Vickcn' l'. Vickery'!7 and Lo-

pez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P.')';
Civil liability was imposed in Vicker\' Vickerr,')\) the seventh
Texas case referring to "absolute and perft:ct c<lndor."J(HI Citing the
quoted phrase to Perc;:, the court of appeals affirmed a jury finding
of breach of fiduciary duty in a suit arising IWI1l tht: mishandling of

9~.

{II

re

L':il~li

ECOIl\ll11elrl(S. Inc.. I'll 13.R.

,,:;1.

.'-l"

Ill,111~r

'\. I)

kx. I l)1):, I. aiI'd

11/

p!ln !lilt! (!lUlled ill lian \/lil. 11(1111 \'alll!i1n I. ,'\~;'l. "-,, . ."IJ",C\ ,Ii-l,'- R. 19()7 WL 'hl)hl
("-.1). Tex. :\lIil. 29.19\17) (lllel1l). 1I,'II,eu! uli,'r rmwlld. '.11 ( \ ,':<),"·(,\·2.:'97·R. II)\)\) \\ L
30.+:'6.+ ("-.D. Te'(. \'lil\ 11.1\)\)91 (lllel1l. and ordnl.

93. Id. at 3-+1,
9'+. fd ;11 .''+~.
9:'. M ~II -'-17.
%. Iii. ;11 ,'-lS.-llJ.
\)7. 9\)9 S.\\· ..:'d .q.:'.
I Ie'\. I')I)\}) (I k(lll, L di",'llll
Ir\lill dC'llI;iI or pe'lili(ln r(lr
reliew I.
9~. '10 S.\\ ..'d ~'i Sh- IL:\ . .:'II(1()) ((jon/;ile/. L ((lI1c'UITlnc' ,Ind di",enlinl'.).
\)9. "-0. OI·9-\·OIO()-\·C\. 1997 \\L 7:,1\)l):, (Te'(\I'I'.--II,ll!SIOIl Ihl Disl.l Dec..+,
1997) (not desiililall.:d ror plIhIICIIIOIl). {'(,I. delli1'li. (N\) S.\\ .2d .'-l2 ITe\. 1999).
100. Vickery I. Vicken. '\.\1. OI·cJ-\·()\(IO-\·CV. I\)\)- \\1. i,'II)I)'. at 36·,)7 (Te'(.
:\pp.- 'llluston list Dis!.1 Dec. -l, 19\)7) (!lot desiilnakd ((II' l,uhlll';llillll), {"'I. dellied. 9l)()
S. W2d -'-\2 (lex, J l)l)9).

,,-10
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a divorce. lol However. Vickery prc)\ides little guidance as to the
extent of the duties imposed by "absolute and perfect candor" because the underlying facts were egreginus.
The husband. an attorney. tricked his wife into getting an uncontested divorce on the pretext that they would later reunite after
threat of certain litigation had passed.I"~ There was evidence that a
second attorney. while acting at the hehest of the husband (a former law school classmate ),I<I.~ filed a petition for divorce in the
wife's name without ever consulting her or obtaining her permission: prepared and filed a counterclaim for the husband. \\ithout
disclosing those facts to the wife: and never infurmed the \\ife of
her rights in a divorce. HI..! Not surprisingly. the second attorney was
found to have breached her fiduciary duties to the \vife. ' "'' HO\vever. such conduct would be regarck'd as highly improper under
vi!'tually any theory of attorney liahilit\ (e.g .. negligence. fraud. or
deceptive trade practices). Consequcntly. it i~ impossihle to say
whether the court of appeals thought that fiduciary duty 1,\\\ imposed obligations greater than those that arise under the rule of
reasonable care, 'vvhich is the touchstone for negligence analysis.
This assessment of Vickery finds support in the suhsequent opinion of Texas Supreme Court Justice Nathan Hecht. In his dissent
from the denial of a petition for review of the case. Hecht noted
that the defaulting second attorney had not been charged with any
form of heightened culpahility and that the asserted breach of fiduciary duty was "no different than ... [an) ordinary malpractice
claim."'()h Justice Hecht did not discu"" ",lhsolute and perfect candor," but merely reprinted as an appl.'l1dl\ the unpublished opinion
of the court of appeals. which contdin:-- the r'hra~c."- Becall~e Justice Hecht's dissent was concerned pnl1laril~ (if not exclusively)
'vvith the propriety of mental distre"" Cli1d c\emplary damages
awarded in the case. it \vould he imrll"\)per to read his opinion as a

Iii\. lieken. ll)l)7 \\L -.'Il)l).'.:11 .~..! 1l'lllli~ 1'1 . I-':II~ ,\: (,'lrI~,IIL ' : : s.\\ .~d
.:2,,1. :'h.' I Tl'\. "\PI'.-C"fJ'U\ CIHI,11 1')<)1. \\rll ,kli" Ii.
11l.:2. Mal I.
11i-'. Id. al '0
Ill..!. M al .~()--' I.
I()'i. /il. al I.
lOb. Vickl'rI \. \'ickl'rI.l)l)l) S.W.:'d -'42 ..~..!'" Ilc\. I')l)l) I Ukcht. L di\\c'JlIIJl~ Irom
denial 01 petilion lor relil'll I.
1117. M :ll '76.
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considered expression of views about the disclosure obligations of
attorneys.
In Lopez, the eighth Texas case to refer to "absolute and perfect
candoe" the quoted phrase appeared in an opinion of Justice Alberto Gonzalez, concurring and dissenting. IllS The facts of the suit
seemed to offer a good opportunity for the court tu explore the
disclosure obligations of attorneys, but that appearance proved to
be illusory.
The law firm in Lopez was sued for breach of contract and
breach of fiduciary duty based on its collection of an additional 5%
contingent fee under contractual language providing that the supplemental fee would be paid if the subject personal injury suit was
"appealed to a higher court. "Ill') After a tentative settlement of the
underlying suit had been reached. the opposing pMty moved to
preserve its right to appeal by filing a cash deposit ill lieu of a cost
bond with the trial court, and a few days later the case was settled. IIO The law firm took the position that under the contract
these facts entitled it to the additional 5 % because an appeal had
been filed, and when the settlement proceeds were divided it received that amount. II I However, three years later the client sued
for a refund of the 5%.112
The Supreme Court held that because the language of the contract was unambiguous, the firm did not breach its contract with
the client by collecting the additional 5% fee. II.1 The court stated
that "the case was 'appealed to a higher court'
n the ... [opposing party] initiated the appellate process by filing ... [the 1cash
deposit."II-l
During the appeal in Lopez, counsel for the clil'llt h~!rJ argued
that the law firm was under a dutv to disclo::,..; to the client "that
there was an alternate colorable construction of the triggering
clause,"II~ but that claim was not addressed by the Supr<..'me Court

lOX.
zalcz.1..
lOt).
110.
Ill.
112.

Lopez Y. \1url11z. Hockcmd c\: Reed. L.L.P .. :::: S.\\'.3d S.'- >h-' k\. ::'llOO) {(j<lllcOllcurring and dissenling).
Id. at X5t).
Id. at X5t)-60.
ld.
Id.

113. Lopez. 22 S.W.3d at 1'160.
114. Id at X5t).
II). It!. at 1'162.
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because it had not been pleaded or briefed. I III For the same reasons the court did not consider whether the law firm had "'concealed the additional fee charge."'IIJustice Gonzalez wrote separately ··to advance the proposition
that attorneys owe a fiduciary duty to fully explain the ramifications of their employment contracts to their c1ients."lls He stated:
[T]here are ... ethical issues in this case. about which the Lopez
family does not complain. that nonl"lhekss deserve discussion. The
first relates to a lawyers's duty to fully and honestly inform his or her
client of a fee arrangement. ... The fiduciary relationship between
attorney and client requires "absolule and perfect candor. openness
and honesty. and the absence of al1\ concealment or deception."
Fundamentallv.
a lawyer
should alwCl\'act in the client's best inter.
.
.
ests. A lawyer and client's negotiatiolls are often imbalanced in
favor of the lawyer because of information inequalities and the client's customary reliance on the la\\\er's kgal advice. Consequently.
a lawyer should fitll\' explain to the client the meaning and impact of
any contract between them. Here. lor e\ampk. tu hest serve their
client. and to protect their own interests. the Munoz firm could have
explained to the Lopez family at the time the contract was signed
that the firm believed it would be entitkd to an additional fee the
moment Westinghouse preserved their right to appeaL even though
an agreement in principle had been reached to settle the case. I It)

Justice Gonzalez's opinion raises important issues. but his disposition of those questions seems equivocal. In discussing attorney
disclosure obligations. he chose to speak in terms of the optional
language of "should" and "'could." rather than the mandatory language of "shall" and "must."lc{) \Vas the Justice simply recommending a preferable course for ~ltt()rneys who aspire to high
moral standards. or was he stating that the cunduct in question was
legally required'? It \vould be difficult to read the disclosure proposed in the final sentence quoted ahove as a mandatory obligation. Doing so would require a higJl degree of prescience on the
part of the attorneys. Quite possibly. at the time the fee agreement
116. Id.
1/- Id.
liS. /.o/!t'.-. " S.\\.3d at :->6-\ ((jon/alC!. L (l)llcllrrin;! and di"el1ting).
Ill). Id. at S67 ((jon/ala. L cOl1curril1;! i1nd lhsellting) (emphasl;" added) (quoting
PerCI \. Kirk & Carri;!<m. :->22 S.W.2d 261. 26) (IC:>; App.-Corpus Christi 1991. writ dc·
nied) and citing \\iIlis \. \Ja\erick. 7611 S.\V.2d h-\2. il-\) (Tex. 19S:-»).
120. Id.

!Vol.
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in Lope:: \\as signed. the law firm \\as not thinking about how the
contract should be construed if at a considerably later point in time
there \vas a large jury verdict and subseyuent settlement negotiations mmed so yuickly that the case settled shortly after the opposing party filed notice of appeal. Surely Justice Gonzalez was not
proposing that there is a legally cnfurceable obligation on attorneys to anticipate and make full disclosures with respect to that
sort of distant contractual-interpretation issue concerning which. at
that time. there \vas no binding legal precedent.
Only one other member of therc\<1s Supreme Court (Chief Justice Phillips) concurred in the Gunzalez opinion. The remaining
Justices were content to note that the plaintiffs had failed to preserve any. claims that the law firm "breached its fiduciar\'. duty.
other than by breaching its contract." 1'I Justice Harriett O'Neill"s
opinion nol<:d that the plaintiffs held not alleged. for example. that
the law firm "concealed the additional".; charge. improperly
delayed execution of the settlement so that Westinghouse would
perfect an appeaL or otherwise manipulated the settlement and appeal process in order to charge the higher fee." I :':'
Lopez was followed by Go/fIler I', Robson I:', which added a new
grammatical twist by leaving out the word "and" between "absolute" and "perfect." and thus referred to "absolute perfect candor,
openness and honesty. and the absence of any concealment or deception." 12 -l The action alleged that an attorney had improperly
handled an estate lawsuit and had deserted the client on the day of
triaL':''> However. the court held that the plaintiff's claims for
breach of fiduciary duty. breach 01 contraCt. and deceptive trade
practices merely restated her legal malpractice claim. which had
been abandoned before trial. i
Consequently. a \erdict for the
plaintiff was re\'ersed.12~ The court did not discuss the disclosure
obligations of attorneys. so the decisiun is not instructive as to the
meaning of "absolute and perfect clIldor."

1'1.
I :'2,
12,1.
12-1.

IJ ~lt s():"
Iii.
'i6 S.\\,:"d ISh (Tc,. APr.-Houston [I-llh DlsLi 2001, pel. denied),
(,oflne\ \. RahsoI1, 'ih S. \\,Jd ISh. ILJ,' (Tc\, r\pp,-Houston [I -Ith Disl.i 2(JO I.

peL denic:d),
12'i. Iii. at II\').
I2h. fd at ILJJ,lJ-l.
127, Id. at IlJ-l.
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Wolfe \'. S/zl'llisl.lc" the ninth Icx<\s case involving an attorney in
which the words "'absolute and perfect candor" appeaL also provides no assistance for interpreting the phrase. for it was stated
simply as part of a recitation of \\hat the plaintiff alleged in her
breach of fiducial'\"- dutv- claim ai!~linst her former attorne\"s.I~')
To
the plaintiffs consternation. the <llturneys. with court permission.
had withdrawn from representing her after the plaintiff had given
an unfavorable deposition in her underlying personal injury suit. I '()
The appellate court did not discuss the "absolute and perfect candor" language or the disclosure obligations of attorneys in affirming a grant of summary judgm,-'nt against the plaintiff.
1l1e most recent Texas case using the phrase "absolute and perfect candor" is Francisco \'. Forni 'I ~l legal malpractice action arising from the alleged mishandling of a medical malpractice claim,l.1:'
The appellate court held in an unpublished opinion that the trial
court had erred in gran~ing sumnun judgment for the attorneys
hecause:
~

The evidence that the Forets settiLd the Franciscos' claims without
consent. withheld that information [rom the Franciscos, needed to
settle the claims for personal ftnancial reasons. and threatened and
harassed the Franciscos to ratifv the "elliLment constitutes more than
a scintilla of evidence the Forcts breached their fiduciary duty to the
Franciscos. I"

llle court invoked the rubric l){' "absolute and perfect candor."
but then quickly shifted to the use or other terms, It wrote "[t]he
fiduciary relationship between attnrney and client requires 'absolute and perfect candor. openness ,1l1d honesty. and the absence of
any concealment or deception,' All at turney is 'obligated to render

I~S.
~()()1.

1.".,,-

:\u. ill·()()·()()~S7·C\'. ~()()I \\1.
no pel.) (not de\I",llated rllr puhliCIIlIc)l1 I

I

!c\.\I'I'.--HI)U\tllll

I ht

DI\l.\ Dc'c. i.,.

I~l). Wolk \. Shclll'il. :\u. ill·IJlI·()il~c;-.(\
211111 \\1. I~s-.'-+": ,It '-+ ITe\. '\1'[,.Houston [hI Di\l.l Dcc. I." 21l111. no pel. 1 1 \( ,k'I~llalCd 1m l'uhlicllllcll1l.

1-'0. M at 2.
1.,1. :\0. il:"·OI·()()7s.'·C\'. ~1)()2 \\L
lien ic:d) (nut de\1.0.na ted lor publ iedl ion).

~."-+"

IT,,\ ..·\pp.-f),t1III\·\pr. II. 21)()2. pel.

U2. Francisco \. Forct. :\u. 1):,,·0 1·1I1l7s.H'\,. 20(J2 \\L ".':"-+:'''.
Dallas Apr. II. 2()02. pel. denied) Inol dC\i",Il.lted 1m publicatlun I.

133. fd at'..!.

aI'

I (Tex. App.-
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a full and fair disclosure of facts material to the client's
representation.' "l~q
The Francisco court did not l'xplore whether there is a difference
between candor that is "absolute and perfect" and disclosure that
is "full and fair." Arguably. the latter phrase is more supple and
might be expected to give risl' to liability less frequently than the
former. Certainly. a malprclctice defendant would prefer to be
judged according to whether his or her disclosures were "full and
fair." rather than by whethl'r thl'Y were "absolutl' and perfect."
The Willis v. /vlavcrickL''i lkcision cited in Frallcisco (which was
also cited by Justice Gonzalez in L()pe~) involved a case submitted
to the jury solely on a negligl'l1ce claim. I;" 1l1at fact might lead one
to conclude that the Francisco cnurt \\as interpreting "absolute and
candor" as roughly equivalent to a duty to act reasonably. The
conduct in Francisco. which il1\olved undisclosed settlement of the
clients' claims. would have gi\l'n rise to liability l'\l'n under a negligence standard. Thus. neithn thl' discussion nor application of the
law in Francisco resolves the question whether the standard of "absolute and perfect candor" means that liability may be imposed
when an attorney acts reasonably (i.e .. nonnegligently) in failing to
disclose information.

B.

California, Oklahoma, ([lid District of Coillfllhia Cases

The phrase "absolute and perfect candor" has appeared in at
least seven other cases raising issues of attorIll'Y liahility. including
two malpractice suits from Califurnia. fr)ur disciplinary proceedings
from Oklahoma, and a tort of t)utrage claim from the District of
Columbia.
In David Welch Co. v. Erskille & Tliflev.IP the California Court
of Appeals quoted the definition of "uherrima lie/cs" from Black's
Lmv Dicriof/af'Y that refers to "ahsolutl' and perfect candor."l<"
The court then went on to Iwld that thl' defendant attorney and

13'+, !d. (qu()ting. Vickery \, Vicker\, l)C)l) S~\\,2d ,,'+2. 376 (Tc\, 1l}99) (Hecht. 1.. dissenting. from denial of petition for rc\ 1"\\) ;lnd \\'illis \ ~ \!ci\cnck, ~60 S,W,2d 11.+2. ".+:"
(l'c:x 191\1\))
13:". 760

s, W,2d 6.+2 (Tex, 19S5),
136, Willis \, :Vlaverick. 76() S,W,2d h.+2, 11'+,' (I\:x. I')i'i')
137. 250 Cal. Rptr. 339 (C'al. CL .-\pp. l\)~S).
13S, David Welch Co, \, Erskine 6: Tullev, 2:"0 Cal. Rptr.
Il}SS)

~'~"),

.,.+1 (Cal. Cl. App,
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law firm breached their fiduciary duties to Welch, a former client,
by failing to disclose that they w'ere "preparing proposals designed
to undercut Welch's business relationships." Ul) Welch was a licensed collection agency that had developed a highly profitable
business by using confidential techniques to collect delinquent contributions to employee benefit trust funds.I-l O The court wrote:
[D]ue to the pre-existing attorney-client relationship during which
defendants were in a position to and did obtain confidential information about Welch's business, these defendants had a higher duty [than
other law firms], which was to refrain from acquiring any pecuniary
interest involving collection work for these trust funds unless they
first notified and obtained the informed consent of Welch to submit
their business proposals. As they did not do so, the trial court properly found that they had breacl<.:d their fiduciary duty towards
Welch.141

Because the attorney-client relationship between Welch and the
law firm had ended prior to the alleged breach,142 David Welch Co.
is best understood as a case based on continuing non-conflict-ofinterest obligations owed to a former client (i.e., the duty not to
misuse confidential information), rather than on the obligation to
disclose relevant information to a present client (i.e., the duty to
communicate). The case therefore is not helpful in understanding
what "absolute and perfect candor" entails in the context of an ongoing attorney-client relationship.
The most recent California case also sheds little light on the
meaning of "absolute and perfect candor." In Fox v. Lichter,
Grossman, Nichols & Sadler, Inc.,143 a minority shareholder
brought a derivative claim alleging that the defendant law firm had
committed several wrongs, including breach of fiduciary duty to
the corporation, its client. 144 In addressing those claims, the court
described attorney-client relationships as uberrima fides,145 and

139. Id. at
140. ld. at
141. Id. at
142. Id. at

343.
340.

343.
341.
143. No. 8148488. 2003 WL 57979 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb 5. 20(3) (not designated for
publication ).
144. Fox v. Lichter. Grossman. Nichols & Sadler. Inc .. No. 8148488.2003 WL 57979.
at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 5. 20(3) (not designated for publication).
145. ld. at "6.
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quoted the definition of that term from Hluck's L/\\' DiCfiol1or\,.I-lh
However. the court did not explore the meaning of the phrase "absolute and perfect candor.··
The court found that a cause of action was stated on two
grounds. First. plaintiff alleged that the law firm had received payments in amounts greater than the 5°1t) of profits that it was entitled
to under its contract with the client.I-l- The excessive nature of
these payments was unknO\vn to the minurity director/piaintiff.I-l S
Second. the plaintiff also alleged that the law firm had failed to
disclose to the client's directors the fact that the firm had facilitated
a disadvantageous transfer of a valuable client asset (the name of
the business) to another entity to which the client then had to pay
royalties fur using the name. 11 '! Howe\er. with respect to both of
these claims. the plaintiff argued that the firm had engaged in intentional deception amounting to fraud. I'II Consequently. the case
has no bearing upon whether a lawyer em he held liable for nonnegligent (i.c.. reasonahle) nondisclosure tdelt falls short of candor
that is "'absolute and perfect.··
Of the four Oklahoma cases quoting the language of "absolute
and perfect candor." three do not shed light upon the disclosure
obligations of attorneys to clients. One of those three cases. State
ex reI. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Laeo.Hc.I'ii concerned false
statements made by an attorney to a nonclient and to the bar. 152 In
the second case. SW[C ex rei. Oklahollw Bar Ass()ciariol1 v. Wallacc. 151 the issues related to an attorney's mishandling of funds as
trustee of the client"s irrevocable trust. i "1 AmI in the third case.
St{/{C ex rei. Ok/a/zo/llil Bar Associatioll L l(n/ol. 1 the proceeding
focused on an attorney's misapplication of insurance proceeds that
belonged in part to the client's doctor. I."', All three of these cases

1.+6. I". at'h n ..i.
1'+7. Id. at
1'+0. Id

.'.

1:'0. Id. at J (alleg.ing. tlLl1 ,h\Ch wer.: "frauJuknill IrdlblcrreJ" tllthc firm anJ that
the firm "Ialsel, swteJ" inimll1atio!1 related to the tr,llbler (lithe hu\il1cSS name).
1:,\1. 8l.' P.2d :'01 (Okla. 1001).
1."2. State ex rei. Okla. Bar .-\'-,'11 I. LaCll\tc. 01., P.2d ~(JI. :'().+ (Okla. 1001).
153. %1 P2d 818 (Okla. 1008).
1."'+. State ('x I'd Okla. Bar Ass'l1 \. Wallace. 061 P.2d oiS ..'\26 (Okla. 1008).
I."." . .+ P ..;d 12.+2 (Okla. 2()()()).
156. State ex rei. Okla. Bar Ass'n I. Tallor.'+ P ..'d 12.+2, 12.+9·50 (Okla, 20()O).
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used the term uhcrril/1(/ fld!'s and ljuoted the definition of that term
from Black's Li/li' DicrioIlOIT. I .'- HU\\ eyer. none of the cases addressed the disclosure obligations of attorneys.
The remaining Oklahoma case. S[i/{e cx rei. Ok/ahol/la 13(/r Associatioll L Busch. I " upheld the disbarment of an attorney based on
unauthorized use of client funds and other misconduct relating to
two different clients. I,') With regard to the one client .. [t ]he e\i
de nee ... [was] clear and conyincing that respondent failed to inform his client (a) that a judgment had been renckred against her
and (b) that it contained language which would make the debt nondischargeable in bankruptcy. "Ih()
With regard to the other client. the court found that the attorney
did not return calls lhl and that '"[n]ot only did. , . [the attorney] fail
to notify ... [the client 1 upon receipt of the funds. but he ... also
failed to remit the proceeds.'"lh~ In discussing the latter misconduct. the court wrote:
A l;l\\yer"s highest fiduciary duty comes into heing \\hcl1 a legal practitioner is entrusted with a client's funds. ,.\ fiducian or the highccit
order. the trustee must meet the settlor's expectatinI1 that the ohligations imposed on the office of trustee will be carried out for the exclusive benefit of the cesflli quc {I'llst. To the cesllii (Ilf(' {I'llS{ a trustee
always owes uherrimo fides. lh "

The court then quoted the definition of llhcrrillw fides from
Black's Law Dictionary that refers to '"absolute and perfect candor. "Ih~ However. the invocation of that terminology was unnecessary. for the attorney had clearly violated the disciplinary rule that
imposes an obligation to '"promptly notify the client" after" 'recei\ing funds or other property in which a client .. , has an interest.' "I'" In addition. the yarious failures [(, communicate. as the

1)7. lill/or. -\ P.~d ,It 1:':'-\ 11.-\:': Irul/ace. L)1l1 P2c1 Jt S21l ,\: n.:'.~: '-11""[('. SI.~ 1'.2d .It
:'i():'i L\: 11 ..\ (Op,da, ('..J .. dh,cnting). In 1,<1('(1\[(' ,lllel 11.11/<1(('. Ih<.: "['llllnlh rLic'Irl'd 1<) (Ill'
atlllrllL\-cliLI11 rc'Lltlllll,hlj" a, uhari/l/(/ tide\. hut 111 1ill/or th:lt (,'l'l1l \\;1' .1j'1'lic',1 11\ ,ie'-

\crihc the ~)h!i~(ltl\.ln' ()( ,\ trU')k~C tn {l ((Sf/fi IllIt' ,'rtt\!.
15x. lJ-:r, P.:'d ,~\ (Okla. ll)lJ9 I.
1:'9, Stal<.' L'\ I'd Okla. Bar Ass'n \, Busch. In. P.:'d .:;S.
IhO. !d at :'1.
Ihl. frl. at 5-\.

16:'. Id.

16-'. M
16-\, Busch. 976 P.:'d
16:1. M at :i-, n.7X.

at :'-\ n.x5.

,j,)

(Okl"
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court recognized, were violations of the disciplinary rule requiring
lawyers to keep clients "reasonably informed" as to the status of
representation,166 As such, the language about "absolute and perfect candor" was surplusage to the court's disciplinary holding and
does not illuminate what types of disclosures must be made by attorneys to avoid civil liability.
Herbin v. Hoetf'e/,lh7 a District of Columbia action referring to
the duty of "absolute and perfect candor." \vas a suit in tort alleging, in relevant part. that a public defender had intentionally disclosed confidences to state prosecutors. I"" In finding that a cause
of action was stated under the tort of outrage, the court, by way of
background, quoted language from the Perc:: decision describing
the attorney-client relationship as entailing duties of the "most
abundant good faith" and "absolute and perfect candor."I"') However, inasmuch as Herbin involved an impermissible revelation of
confidences to others, rather than a failure to communicate with
the client it is uninstructive about the duty of candor that is owed
to a client.

C.

The Proper Scope of "Absolute and Perfect Candor"

Although the phrase "absolute and perfect candor" has been invoked frequently by Texas courts. as well as by tribunals in other
states, the cases fail to establish that the language imposes a
broadly applicable duty, enforceable in civil actions, to disclose information even when exercise of reasonable care would not call for
its disclosure. Some of the cases referring tn "absolute and perfect
candor" can be largely disregarded on the ground that in those
suits the courts were faced nOl with issues of civil liabilit \" but \vith
the considerably different questions of whether diSCiplinary or
criminal liability should be imposed. i - II Other cases can be discounted because while the phrase "absolute and perfect candor"

I6(), M at :'iO n,-",S, :'i-L
167, S06 A.::'d ISh (I).C. 2()()2),
16S, Herhin \, HodleL SOh A.::'d IS6. ISY (D.C'. 2()():::)
16Y, 1(/, at IY7 (citint! Perez \, Kirk 8: Carri"an, S2::: S, \\.2d :::h L 2h:'i I Tex, App,Corpus Christi IYYL writ denied),
170, See, e,g, Hcfncr \, Statc. 7J:'i S.\V,2d hOS, h2h IIC'\. App,-Dallas IYS7, pel.
ref'd) (imolvint! criminal prosecution): State \. Baker, :'iJ') S,W.2d Jh7, 3hY (Tex, Civ,
App,-Austin IY76, writ rd'cl n,r.e,) (per curiam) lin\oivin'l disharment),
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was invoked it was not explored in any meaningful way!?1 or was
not critical to the disposition of those suits. 172 In addition, some of
the decisions using the term "absolute and perfect candor" that
have imposed liability can be explained simply by the fact that the
conduct in question violated clearly established standards of attorney conduct such as the rules relating to handling of client
funds. 171
It is reasonable to assume that the duty of "absolute and perfect
candor" applies most forcefully in instances where the interests of
the attorney and client are adverse.!7.) as in the case of a business
transaction between them. 17 .'i Although cases involving these types
of facts generally have not used the phrase "absolute and perfect
candor," they frequently speak of "lIrherrima fides," 176 which, as

171. Sec Lope/ v. \IUI10L Hockem<l & Reed. LLP .. 22 S.W.3d H57. H02 (Tex. 20(0)
(finding. that mmt breach-of-fiduciary duty claims "ere 110t preserved): Goffney Y. Rahson .
.'h S.\\·.3d IHh. I'-I() (TeX. App.--Houston [I.+th DisL/ 2()OI. no pel.) (restating. fiduciar\'
duty claim as legal malpractice claim which had heen dh,lndoned at trial): Wolfe v. Shellisl.
:\(). OI-(J()-005H7-CV. 2001 WL 15H73.+H. at *'+-5 (kx. App.-Houston list DisLj Dec. 13.
2()()1. no peL) (eliminating. discussion of "absolutc and perfcct candor"). See generallv
Stall: ex rei. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Taylor . .+ P.3d 12.+2 (Okla. 20(0) (failing to address the
disclosure obligations of attorncys): Statc ex rei. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Wallace. 961 P.2d 818
(Okla. 199H) (failing. to address the disclosure oblig.ations of attorneys): State ex rei. Okla.
Bar Ass'n v. Lacoste. H13 P.2d 50 I (Okla. 1(91) (failing. to address the disclosure oblig.utlons of attorneys).
172. Sec. c.g. /11 rc Leg.aJ Econometrics. Inc.. 101 B.R. 33I. 3.+7 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
1'!95). IIf{'d ill parr illld l'IICtliei/ ill part slIl1. 1101/1 Vaug.hn v. Akin. No. 3-95-CV-O'+57-R.
Ill'!7 \\L .~60017 (;';.D. Tex. Aug.. ::'0.19<)7) (mem.). 11{)I'<'allifrer rcmalld. No. CA 3:9:-\-CV~2'!7-R. 199'-1 WL 30.+56.+ (:\.D. Tex. \la\ II. 190'-1) (mem. and ordcr) (finding the conduct
In qUe')lion to constitutc ncg.lig.ence and g.f<lSS neg.lig.ence): Francisco v. Foret. No. 05-01IIO::-\.'-CV. 2002 \VL 53.~'+-':;. ;ll''+ (1ex. App.-D;ilLI\ Apr. II. 2002. pel. denied) (not
de,)Ig.I];Ite'd fm puhlicatloll) kljuating. "absolute' and perfect candor" with "full and fair"
dl\cl," :Irc): Vlckcn v. Vickery. ;';0. 01-9'+-0 I ()()'+-C\'. 1997 WL 751995. at "33-3'+ (Tex .
. \I'p.-Hou\ton list Disl.j Dcc. .+. 1097) (not designated for publication). pCI. dellicd. 999
'i.\\'.2d .,.+2 (Tex. 19<)9) Uindll1g. the conduct could Violate ordinary negligence principles).
17.'. See Statc ex rei. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Busch. 'l7h P.::'d 3H. 53 (Okla. 1999) (finding
the conduct clearlv violated di\cq,linan rule
the handling. of client propcrtv).
17-+. cr RI \1 \11 \11,1 (TIlIl{llj ')j 11I1 L\\v (i"\II"I"," L\VV'IIRS ~ 16(3) (::'O()O)
1expressing. that "a I,\\\ver mu')t.
. not empl()v aclvant;lg.L"; arising. from the client-Iawver
relation')hlp in a manner advL'rse to the client").
175. SCI' (,oldcn '.;ug.g.ct. Inc. v. Ham. 5:-\9 P.2d 17.'. 175 (:\ev. 1(79) (holding. that a
corporate director. who ohtained a leaschold with ,li1 option to purchase at a time when the
corporation had an interest in acquiring. such properlY. had a "dut\' to the corporatioll. as
llS attorncy. not onlv to inform.. [the corporation/ fullv of the factual circumstances of
thc transaction. hut also ... of its rig.i1ts in rcg.ard thereto").
176. See Lad\' v. Worthing.ham. 135 P.2d 205. ::'07 (Cal. Dis!. Ct. App. 1(43) (involving.
')uit Iw attorney to enforce promis~or\' note): Johnsoll Y. Cofer. J D S.W.2d 963. 905 (lex.
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discussed above, is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as requiring
"absolute and perfect candor. "177 Judicial decisions irrefutably establish that business transactions between lawyer and client are
presumptively fraudulent. 17H Such dealings will not survive scrutiny unless the lawyer proves that the highest standards of disclosure and fair dealing were observed. J79 11111S:
If an attorney purchases his client's property. concerning which his
advice is sought. the transaction is always \iewed with suspicion. and
the attorney assumes the heavy hurden of proving not only that there
was no overreaching of the client. hut that the client acted upon the
fullest information and advice as to his rights. In other words. the

Civ. App.-Austin 193/\. no writ) (im'olving suit to rec()\ er rents retained under emplm'ment contract): Baird v. La\cock. 9-1 S.W.2d 11/\:'\, II Ill) Cl\:x. ('i\. App.-Texarkana 1936.
writ dism'd) (involving sale of land h\' client to attorney\: Bell Y. Ramirez. 299 S.W. 6:':'.
6:'/\ (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1927. writ reCd n.r.e.) (in\\
:lg suit 11\ client to cancel deed).

177. See State \'. Baker. :;39 S.W.2d 367.37-1 (Tex. Ci\. App.-Austin 1976. \\Tit rcl'd
n.Le.) (per curiam) (explaining "lIrilerrima fides" as "'Itlhe most ahundant good faith: absolute and perfect candor or openness and honesty: the absence of anv concealment or
deception. however slight''').
178. See Baird. 94 S.W.2d at 1189 (applying the rule that the relation between an
attorney and client is presumptively fraudulent in a suit for cancellation of deed); Bell. 299
S.W. at 658 (stating that "agreements between them in the course of the relation arc prima
facie presumed to be fraudulent"): see a/50 Cofer. 113 S.W.2d at 965 (stating that the rule
that a transaction between a lawyer and client will be "strictlv scrutinized against the attorney. even to the extent of heing considered prima facie fraudulent" only applies "after that
relationship of attorney and client has come into existence: and docs not apply to a contract of cmplmment, wherehv such relationship is created").
179. SCI'. e.g .. Kcck. \Iahin & Catc v. 'iat'l l'nion Fire ins. Co .. 20 S.W ..1d 692.699
(Tex. 20()O) (stating that "Ihlecause the relationship is fiducial'\' in nature. there is a pre:SLllllption of unfairness or in\aliditv attaching to . . contract', Ibetween attornc\s and clIents!"). Similarlv. in the case III re Bre[:: the court stated:
When the nidence reflects. as it docs in th:, case. that an attorney has seeillinglv
pwfited at the expense of his clients. it is incumhent upon the attorney to show bv
clear and satisfactory e\idl'nce. not only that there \\,!,; n<l undue influence or unfairness. hut that his client had "II [lie illfiJrlllillioll and ad\ icc reasonahlv Ilecessal'\ to
comprehend and ulldersl<ind the details of their bUSlill'SS 'lrrangelllcnt.
III I'C Gretz. :,\-12 P.2d 1227. 12-1:' (\hlllt. 197:') (emphaSIS <Jelded): SCi' also Been \. Stall'
Bar. 739 P.2d 12/\9. 129.) (Cal. 19/\7) (stating in a disciplinan action that husiness tr,lllsactions between attorneY ,md client \\ill be '''set aside at the Ille:re instance of the clicnt.
unless the attornev can show bv extrinsic evidence that his client acted with full knowledgc
of all the facts connected with such transaction. and fullv understood their effect'''): Ball v_
Posey. 222 Cal. Rptr. 7-16. 7-19 (Cal. C1. App. 19/\6) (stating that an "attornev must demonstratc that tile client was fullv informed on all mattcrs related to an\' transactions betwcen
them" ).
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attorney must prove uberrima fir/es. or the transaction \\ill he set
aside by a court of equity. lSI)
In such cases-the cases about which Justice Story was main Iv concernedlSI-it is accurate to say that attorneys have a duty or :'absolute and perfect candor."
The interests of attorney and client may also differ substantially
even in cases not involving business transactions. and in such instances a high degree of disclosure may be required. llws. some
authorities hold that there is a duty to inform a client of when a
malpractice claim might be brought against the 1a\\yerl'C and
others hold that there is a duty to fulh disclose to class members

ISO, Bell \, Ramirl'l, ~<)9 S,\\·. to).', (,)S lle\. ('i\. ,\pp.-~AlIslin 1l)~7 \\1'11 reCd n,r.l'.1
(emphasis addcdl (citing Young \, \lurpl1\, '1- ".\\ .+% (\\i\, 19(1.~11
lSI. Sec I J()\I'I'II SI()R" C"\I\II'I \1<11 \ ,,.... b)1 II, .II HI\I'I,:I III '-<I ~ .'IIIII::th
cd, IS(7) (di\clIsslng contracts and tran\~Ktil)n\ he'I\\CCn cllcnl\ and i;I\\\c'I'\I.
I S~, Circlc ehc\ rolet Co. \, (J iordano. Ii;! I Ie- I~lll ,\: Ciesl a, hh:' A.:'d 'III), '1'+ I".J
1<)9)1. ahrog/'ti/cd /)1 Olds \. Donnclll, h96 .-\.:'d h,'.' 1"..1.19<)71. rilc Clillri \\nlle:

An attornl'\' has an ethical ohligation to alill'c a clicnt that hc or shl' nm,ht ha\l' a
claim against that allorne\', c\en if such alII icc Ilie, in thc facc olthat dttuml'\'\; ()\\ll
interests, , , , I11lls, an attornc\' who reali7es hc nr she has made a mistaKc Illust immediately notify the client of the mistaKe as \\ell as the clil'llt's right to ohtain Ile\, counsel and sUe the attorney for nl'gligl'ncc,
[Tlhe attorney is under an overriding
ethical ohligation to inform the client of the accrual of a prohahle claim ,Igainst that
attorney,

Iii. Circle C/U'I'ro/CI was abrogated on other groulllh 11\ a latcr C<hC that reaffirmed that
"[tjhl' Rl I f , 01 PROIISSI()'.\I (''''-Ill' I still I-e'quirl' an attornl'\ to Ilolil\ the cliellt that
he or she: rna\' have a legal-malpractice ci;lim e'\ Cll If llotiflGltioll IS a"alll\l the attorneY's
own interest." Sec Olds \, Donnelh, hlih ,\,::d ().'3, hen ("..I. I'N711lwldlng Ihal the l'l1tirl'
contf'()\'l'rsv doctrine docs Ilot compl'lthc a"Cni,\ll III II kilalmlipr;JClice cbl1l in ul1c1erhing action that gi\cs risc to the claim): \(',' (//\11 /I! I,' \1;ltll'r III Tllil,\I)..+r ".YS2d "II, ~I
(",y, App. Di\, 19S::) (Iwlding that all alllllllC:\ 'lle'c'kCI 01 a clil'llt', c"llm, lilld Liliurc to
noti!\' the clicnt of the naturc and e'\lellt of lile' ,111\\I'I1e\ , l1l;liprllcllcl' \\dlT:Illtcd a ,i\
month suspcnsion: ",'\n attorne\ has a r'rok"llllul clut\ to promplh notii\ hi' cllcnl 1)1' his
failure to act ,Ind 1'1' Ihl' p'l\,ible claim ni\ l'llClll 111.1\ lilu, ha\c Ilgdll1\t 111111"): RI SI·III·
w:sr (THIR!)) ,)( I HI LI\\ (,Il\ I R'I'-<, L\\\, I I" ~ :'11 cmt, c (21101J1 (
Ih,lt "[ill' thl'
lawyer's conduct of Ihe malkr gl\es the C'IIClli ,I 'U!"tlllllial Illdil'racilcl' ,'I:llm a;2,llilst thl'
la\\\'cr, thc la\\\cr mu,t di,closc' tlul to the' elle'lll" I. Other '(luree, h,I\c' j,\ul'lc'd \\ilctilcr
a hroadh applicahle clut\ to disclose: mall,ractll'c' ,'\1\1\. See "anc\ J. \11")1','. 1lIll'limli(\1l\
oFCirc!c ('hc\rolet I()I' ,'\II(!rJ/e\ ."iI/pmclI"" ,!Jul 1!lI,m,') Clilin, ~,\ Rt I' ,I )" I ..J. ,7. 71
76 (191)h) (cli\cu\\lI1g frlctors Il'!c\ant to ;1 dlll\ 10 di'cllhc :mel '{;II)nl:, "I h,l\c' i:lllcd til
unC()\l'r a single instance in which a Ll\\\cr \\ Ci\ cllilc:r 'llCCC"rlllh slle'd ,lr
as II
result of a merc failure to alhisc the client ollilc: Id\\ \e'r's ()\\ n m~tll'r:letle'c"l: Danlcl \1.
Sen iss, Ilte EV()/lIlioll orlhe --Elllire C()lIlmH'1'\1 "/)IIClrilie alld ft.1 DII/llnll.' !c'l/i'Ci\ OIlI/IC
Allomer-C/i1'1II RC/llllolI\hijl: Whal A 1,(JIlt;, SIUlII!!,(' li-ip It !/III 8e('/l, I) 51 1("'" H II I
C():SSI. LJ. 779, S06 (1999) (stating that "[:lln attornc\ . "cannot conccl\;lhl\ he ()hligakLi
to inform the client C\l'rv time a miSlilkl' is madc").
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the amount of attorney's fees sought in a class action. lxi So too,
.. [t]he duty of loyalty requires a lawyer. at the time of retainer, to
disclose to the client all the circumstances of his relations to the
parties and any interest or connection with the matter at hand that
could influence the client in the selection of counscl."IS~
In a relatively small number of areas, the legal profession has
developed rules that call for a high degree of disclosure of information. For example. in seeking to obtain an effective client waiver of
a conflict of interest. the lawyer must disclose the existence. nature,
implications. and possible adverse consequences of the conflicL ls ."
In dealing with client property. a lawyer must promptly notify a
client of its receipt. 1xh In entering into an agreement for legal services with a new client. the lawyer must disclose the basis or rate of
the fee. lx7 And upon receiving a settlement offer. a lawyer ordina-

.'I""

IS3 .
Cell. \.\otor;, Corp. \. Bln\ecl. ')II> S.W ..:'d Y-F). YS7-."'S (1'-'\. IYYh) (statin),!.
that "ciass act inn setticmellt notices must C()IlLlln the 111<l\II11Um i11l1()Ul1i of attorneY's ke,
sllu),!.ht h\' cia" coull,el and specify the prol'(),ecl method of cilculatlll),!. the ,Iward" and
citin),!. similar decisiolls).
184. Peaslee v. Pedeo. Inc .. 388 A.2d IO.i. 107 (Me. IY78) (involving an attorney's
failure to disclose that he was an officer and stockholder of the other part\' to a proposed
transaction ).
18S. Conncn Inc. \'. Baskin. 803 S.W.2d .flf). 4IY (Tex. App.-EI Paso IYY/, no writ)
(statin),!. that Texas di\ciplinary rules permit "an attorne\' or law firm to continue multiple
represcntation of adversary clients where ... COllsent is ohtained from each cliellt after full
disclosure of tile existellce. nature. implications ,IIld possible advcrse cOllsequellces of such
multiple representation"): ICC a/so Simpson \ . .Iailles. YO" F2d .-n~ .i77 (Sth Cir. I <)YO)
(i1oldin),!. that under Te\as law. "after full lhclo;,ure' hy' the attorney. il may' he proper ill
some circumstances for an attorneY to repn:,en! hllh ,ide, in a real c"t:lk transaction"):
Ernl'lmers Cas. CIl. v. Tilkv. 4Y6 S.W.~d 5."2. 'i5:-; ITe\. I07.i) (statlill.' Illdt "[iJf a conflict
,Irises hctv\ecll the IlllereSh of the insurer ,lIld Ihe Illsured. the attorney ,)\\e'S a duty to the
in'iurcd to imn1ediateh <Id\'isc hirn of 'he cOlllllet"\: Two Thirty :\llle' .I')lllt Vellture \. Joe.
I1Il S.W.3d x%. l)(H) (1\:\. App.-Dallas 20()1. pet filed) (holdin),!. tlLlt l'\ldence was sufficil'llt to raise a fact issue as III whether an attorney ,llld 1:1\\ firm hreaehed their flcluei,Jrv
duty 11\ failill),!. to disclose that the attornc\. a' a Illl'rnhcr of "[e[it\ [c['Hllled. would or
C<luld lake position, that \\oule! affect the real e"Llte tran>;aetiolls In \\hich" the firm represellted the pla!l1tiff).
IXh. \IOIl! I RI II S (l! PI{()I'I CO .... !)l , ! R. I 15(d) (2()().:') (rcLlilllc: tlut "[U[pOIl n:cei\ lIlil funds or other I,rupertv in which a cliellt or third person Ius ,Ill !I1krcst. a lawvcr
shall promptlY notify the Clie'llt or third pcr'OIl
,lIld. upon re'quest h\ the cliellt or third
Pl'fSOIl. ,hall promptl\ render a full
such proper!\ ").
IS7. Sec Jad~s'lI1 LI\\ Office. p.e \. Chappell.:'.7 S.W.3d I). 22-2.i (Tcx. App.-Tvkr
2tl()(). pet. lk'nie:d) (iwldin),!. that the evidence. \\ illch ,howed among other thin),!.s that the
attorneYs were V<l),!.Ul' re),!.ardin),!. their fel' arrangelllent. was sufficient to support the jurv's
finding elf hreach of fiduciarY' duty): 'vloJ)J1 Rl ! IS,)I P[{OF'I CO'.I)l <"I R. I.S(b) (2002)
(stating that "ltJhe scope: of the representation :ll1d the has is or rate of the fee and expenses
for which the client \\ ill he responsihle shall he: cOIllll1unicated to the client. preferahly in

.
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rily must communicate the offer to the client promptly.liiii In these
and perhaps other areas where specific rules of conduct have crystalized, attorneys are faced with demanding disclosure obligations.
However. outside of these limited contexts, the disclosure obligations of attorneys are more properly described by the rule of
negligence than by a rule of "'absolute and perfect candor": an attorney must act reasonably in providing information to the client. lii ') There is little, if anything. in case law to suggest that, in a
case not governed by a specific rule mandating disclosure, nonnegwriting. hefore or within a reasonahle lime after commencing the representation"). According to the American Law Institute:
The hasis or rate might he a specified hnuril charge. a percentage. m :1 set of factors
on which the fee will he hased. If the fcc IS h:lsed on a percent:tge of recovery (or
other hase). the client should also he informcd if a different percc'nLl"-c applies in the
cvent of settlement, trial, or appeal. For a client sophisticated in
lawyers. a
statement that "we will charge our usual hOllril rate's" ordinariil \\ill 'illffice .... The
information should indicate the matter tnr \\ hleh the fee will hc' due. for example.
"preparing and trving (hut not appealim!1 I<lur auto inlun' suit." It the services arc
not specifically descrihed. the lawyer \\ i II hc he Id under ~ I X to pm\ Ide t he services
that a reasonahle client would have eXlxcted, \lost states require that contingent-fee
contracts he in writing.
RFSTAIEMENT (THIRD) OF IHE LAW G()VER~I~(I LAW),LRS ~ 3x cmt. h (2000). It is important to note. however. that the disclosure ohligations pertinent to contract initiation are
limited. If no professional relationship hetween the attorney and client exists at the lime
the agreement is entered into. the stringent rules applicahle to husiness transactions hetween attorney and client do not apply. and therefore the contract is not presumptively
fraudulent on the part of the attornev. See Johnson v, Cofer. 113 S,\V,2d 963. 965 (Tex.
Civ, App.-Austin 1938. no writ) (stating that the rule where a transaction hetween lawyer
and client will he "strictly scrutinized" onlv applies after commencement of attorney and
client relationship),
18K See Rizzo v, Haines. 555 A.2d 5x, hh (Pa, 19S9) (holding that an attorney's failure
to convey' each settlement offcr to clients in l'er'nn~tI Injun' cases and failure to investigate
offers that were proposed constituted malpractice): J"u, v, ,.'>.uto-Owners Ins. Co .. 28x
01.W,2d '+·B. '+-1:'; (Mich, ('t. App, 1979) (holdillg that an attorne\' hreaciled the applicahle
standard of care hv failing to inform his client ni settlement oilers prim to trial): MOIH,I
RIll,S 01 PIUlI·1. C()~[)t ;('T R, I A cmt. I (:'O()2 i (stating that "<) lawvCf who receives from
opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a ci\ II contmvers\' or a proffered plea hargain in
a criminal case must prompt Iv inform the Clie'lll of its suhstance" Ullle'sS pnor discussions
with the client have left it clear that tile propns;tI will be unacceptable I.
Ix9, Even authorities that define the fiduc'I;lr\ disclosure ()hlig~ltiolls of attorneys in
highly demanding terms sometimes interpret tiltlsC duties in a way tildt seems little different from a negligence analysis. Sec. e,g .. 8urlen \lntors. Inc. \. Balch. 513 P,2d 582. 580
(Wa"h, C1. App, 1973) (stating that an attornc\ l1lust c:xercise reasonahle care): 2 RO;-.JALD
E. M,\I.LI·.~ & JI.'FIRLY M. SMITH. LUIAJ. \hl I'RACIICL 0 1'+,19 (::;til cd. 2()()O) (slating
"there must he complete disclosure of all information that may hear on the quality of the
, The test of di,closure is objective. measured hy what an
attorney's representation.
attorney of ordinary skill and knowledge should tell the client"),
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ligent failure to furnish information to a client will give rise to civil
liability. Thus. not surprisingly. the Restatement says that '"[a] lawyer who has acted with reasonable care is not liable in damages for
breach of fiduciary duty."I')() Consequently. the "absolute and perfect candor" terminology should be confined to the context of lawyer-client business transactions or conduct that violates other wellestablished rules governing attorney conduct. such as those relating
to conflict of interest. handling of client funds. communication of
settlement offers. and contract initiation.
Unfortunately. the proclivity of courts to invoke Latin terms and
repeat catchy phrases has given the "absolute and perfect candor"
terminology a life of its own. The phrase is frequently repeated
without consideration of its demands or pmper scope of
application.
The risk. of course. is that e'\pansi\e;udicial writing. even if it
does not determine the outcome of appellate cases. has an undisciplined influence on subsequent legal scholarship and on daily law
practice. The duty of "'absolute and perfect candor" has been referred to in a number of articles.I'I1 including works by this authoLI'I2 In light of sweeping judicial rhetoric about "absolute and

190, See REST';' rF~IF"'1 (THIRD) ()I I I II LAW GO\i"'I'" L\\\YIRS ~ 49 cmL d
(2000) (noting. however. that remedies such as di,qualification. re,titution. and inlunctive
relief may he a\ailahk).
191, See. {',g,. Rov Ryden Andersoll & Walter \V, Steck. J r .. Fiililcillr\' Dun'. TOri and
('Ul1ImCl: A Prilller Oil Ihe Legal JfalJlrllcli(e 1'11::::/('. 47 S\1l L. RI\, 2.l~. 240 (1994)
(referring to "ah,olute and perfect candor"): Dd\id J. Beck. l.e~(i1 ,1/!llpl'({crice ill Texas. 50
13,\ YI()R L Ri\, 551.552 (19()~) (referring to "al'\oluk and rerteet candor"): \krcdith J.
Duncan. !~!'~(/I ,\.falproCEic!' hr Am' Olhel' \ ({/!II': \\'//\ a fJreoc/1 o( Fit/lleillrl Dlln Clailll
Docs Vor Smell ill .'i,,'ec!. 34 W,\KI. FI WI, I L RI \, 11.;7. II S2 ( IIN'!) (referring to "ahso~
lute and perfect candor"): Lawrence.l, Lllto, The RCII!7IclI/l'l/I Ii/the !~(/I\' (jo\'('l'IIillg L({II'~
len: ,.! Viell limll Ih" Trellches, 2n H( 1I \ I J{ \ L. Rl \ , /197. 721 (19l)~) (noting that "some
courts describe a lawver's obligations in c\tra\:lgant hut \aguc (cr111\." and then quoting
the definition of IIl>erl'illlll tiiles as requirillC' ".lho!Ulc' :Ind I,cri'ce( Cll1cillr"): Stc\e \!cConnicn & Rnh\n Bigelow. SIIIIIIII(//'\ "fRcel'llI [)('II'/U/}IIlCIIII ill /,'1(/\ rl'~({1 '>/II/{Jrtlnicc fAll ...
en SI. \L\R,', LJ, /107.622 coo..:) (quotln,' the' dc'cl'>iOIl ,latlne' :1 dlll\ of '''ahsolute perfect candor'''): J<lhn S, Pierce & Be\erh ,'\, Ilrdnd, RI'celil {)/'I C/UI'II/I'IIII ill .. \llOl'IIe.\' (i'l'
Dil{JIIII'I.7 l'SI-, \hl{. L.J, 2()5. 207 IIIN.+-'J,') Irekrring t" "dh\l,IIJle and perfect candor"): Errin \Iartin. Comment. The Ullt' 11(/1 {ic(,11 f)rilll'll olllhe ,.\II()rnr'l'-C/ielll Reloliollship: The Implil'miolls of Burrow \, /\rce ()1lr;',\'([,1 l'mClili()ncn, .<:' '1'1 " TI Cli. L RI\,
0,91. 396 (2001) (referring to "ahsolute and perkct candor"),
192. See Vincent R, Johnson. The Fillin of COlllll1llllimlillg I,illl Plllllli,'(, ClliSS ,Hcmbers. 1 7 RI\, LIII<;, 497. 519n.72 (11)9~) (rcierring to "absolute and perfect candor"):sce
a/so Vincent R. Johnson. Elizical IsslIes ill [)ra/iillg Licellsill~ Alireemeills. ill 45~ P"eI("[IS1'-(; L,,\\ J'SI'lII I[ p'\ I 1,'.;1'. C(II''IRI(illl" TR_\IlF'I,\Rr-:S. ,\'.;!) LllLRARY PROPER!'Y
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perfect candor." a writer reflecting on a case requiring insurance
defense counsel to disclose a conflict between the insurer and the
insured may over-interpret the case as creating an obligation to disclose "any information that might prevent the fulfillment of' the
obligations entailed by an attorney-client relationship,I'13 Or a
writer may over-construe a decision imposing liability based on the
failure to disclose that the client's case had not been filed within
the period of limitations as creating a duty to disclose "all information which may bear upon the quality of the attorney's representation."I'J-l Overstatements in legal scholarship should be avoided
because words matter. Imprecise language can be costly to the legal system. It is but a short step from a judicial opinion stating that
a lawyer has a duty of "absolute and perfect candor" to the filing of
a lawsuit on behalf of a client who believes his or her lawyer's disclosures fell short of being "absolute and perfect." 1'15 ConseCOIR\I H.\'.DIl()Or.: SERIES 173, 177-78 (19l)(. I. WL 4:1K I'Ll 1';11 17.~ (re:fcrring to "ahsoIUle and perfeci candor").
193. David J. Beck. Legal Halpracricc ill /('XIIS. 43A 8.\ 11.< Ji{ L. RI \. I. 4:1 & 4:1 n.l 'i
(1991). WL 43 BLRLR 43 (interpreting only Emplorcrs (as. Co. t. Tilln, ·+90 S.W.2d :'i:'i2.
:'58 (Tex. 1(73). in the same paragraph that referred to the duty of "absolute and perfect
candor"). The statement quoted above in the text also appears in David 1. Beck. Legal
Halpraclice ill Texas Second Edlliol1.:10 B,\YI Oi{ L. RE\. :1:11. 608 (1998). which cites three
cases as support in addition to Til/n.
194. Scc Dayid 1. Beck. Legal ,Halpracrice ill 7('x{/s. 4.lA B \ 11 ()R L. RI\. 1. 40 & 46
11.22 (1991). \VL 43 BLRLR 43 (interpreting ..-llll<'l \. Pllr;. 4l):i S.\\'.2d :'KI. :'i<'l3 (Tex. Ci\.
App.-Eastland 1973. writ reCd). shortly after reference to dutl of "ahsolute: and perfeci
candor"). To he: fair. an earlier Tnas Che. !lot cited hI Beck. had held thai all attorneY
owcs to a clicnt a dutl "to affirmatilt:l\ dl,cl()\c to him. not on" all material facls which
would affect the:ir relationship hut to disclo\e the Ic;!al cOi1',eqllcl1cc' III thme facl> ;h well."
BrIant I. Lewis. ~7 S.W.2d 0()4. 607 Ck\. ('1\ .\pp.-,\U'dlll 1l)31). \\fit dism'd II.n.!.).
Howeler. there: is a dilkrencc-pe:rhaps a sl;!lllficlI1C ';lfe:rc'ncc'-hdllecl1 hcin~ ohllged
to disclose "({II ill/rlmWli()/l Ilhich mal he;lr lIJ,\ln the: qualill "Ithe dII0rJ1e:1 \ represellullion" and hcin~ re:quired to disc!."e all 1l1U!l'rilil !I/('[\ rllil! 111(1\ alicct the relationship.
Dalid J. Beck. Legal Jfalpmcrlce ill 7('\11\. 4.'.\ [3 \ 11 (,R L RI \. I. 4(> (I <)<) I). WL ..Ll
BLRLR.+3 (cmphasis addcd). The sLikJl1c'l1t qUllkd from the I(NI Ikck arllck Ilppe;lre:d
more recentl, ill Da\id J. Beck . I.cglll\fill!i/i/ill(·,' ill 7i'\{/I \,'cund F"-dirinll.:ill H.I 11' II{ L.
RI I. :i:;J. 61D (]'}l)K).
19:;. Sce. ('c;. Wolle \. Shellis!.
()1-11I1-1)()~<'l7-C\. :(1111 \\1
1.':-;7 .~4K . at-l (kl .
.\pp.-Houst()ll list Dis!.1 Dec. Li . :()Ol. no pc!. 1 (not dC\lgndlL'li 1m puhlicatioll) (
dutic, tu
communicale with Plalllthat defcndants "hreached thl'ir respective
tiff in ahsolute and perfect candor"): Kinc<lid c\: Horton. \I<lrk L Kincaid. & B. RU"e?1I
Horton's Second Supplemental Response, 10 Requests lor [)isclo,>ure:s . Wed~e \lallagc'ment. Inc. v. Tobey . Exhibit A at 2-6. 10-1:;. IS-20 (34:ith DIS!. CL Trayis COUllt,. TCI.
Nov. D. 2()02) (No. l)K-()<):'i12) (alleging thai the defelldant"- malpractice included no Ie"
than 23 different hreaches of "failing. to make? full disclosure: olmatcrial facts. alld to e:\crcise ahsolutc and perfect candor").
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quently, it is important to he precise in articulating the obligations
of lawyers,
IV,

CONSIDERATIONS BL\RIV; ON TIlE Dt:TY TO DISCLOSE

The disclosure obligations of attorneys to clients are limited hy a
variety of considerations, including scope of representation, materiality, client knowledge, competing obligations to others, client
agreement. and threatened harm to the client or others, The following sections explore these important limitations on the duty of
attorneys to communicate information,

A,

Scope

of the

Represenrafiofl

Perhaps no concept is more important to undl.?rstanding the extent of attorney obligations than scope of repreSI.?Ilt;ltion. l % 1l1is is
true because lawyers and clients have great leeway in tailoring the
range of the work that attorneys will perform.I'r' At one extreme, a
196. See, e.g ..

R. ()f PROI-'f CO:"DIC I R. 1.02. rep rimed ill TEX.
tit. 2, 5ubtit. G app. A (Vernon 1991\) (TEX. S 1.-\ II BAR R. art. X, ~ 9)
(stating the Texas rule bearing on representation. which is typicall\' contained in state
codes of attorney conduct), The commentary to Texas Rule I,()~ pnl\ides:
The scope of representation provided bv a lawyer rna\' be limited Iw a!!re:ement with
the client or bv the: te:rms under which the 1;111\e:r\ st'nice:s are: i11:ldc :Ililil:lble to the
client. For example. a retainer may he 1m ,I 'I'colicallv defincd ohlc'clIle, Likcllise.
representation provided through :1 ic!!al :Iid a"enn ma\' be "Uh/l'Cl t() Ilmiialions on
the types of cases the agency handks, SIIll!l:lril'. \Ihen a LII\lc'r ILlS hc'cn I'et:lined Ill'
an insurer to reprcsent an insured. the rt'I'I-c'sl'nldlion mal' he Illlllkd In l11atters fclated to the insurance co\crage. 'Ille sCOpc' \1 !thin 1IIIIch the I-CrresL'Ili:llion IS undertaken also mal' exclude specific ohicct!\es ()[' mcan". sueh as Ihose 111,11 thc' IliI\ler or
client regards as rt'l'u!!nant or iml'rudent,
Id. cm!. -I.
197, See J,\\II s E. 'vIol I II-RVJ. C\SI S \'.1) \1 \II RI \1 , ," 11I1 I \II Ci()\IR,IV;
L\IIYu{S 192 (20()()) (explaining IWII thc fel.ltillnsilil' ,:In he: tailofed!. \llllitefl1o stlllcs:
Becausc the ,copc of their relationship IS "c'lh:r,i/11 set 1'1' contr:ICI: 1,1\1 \ cTS Illld tht'lr
clients mal' lle!!(lIiatc and scttle ul'OI1 the 1.1\\\er\ scope of rc'prcsC'llt.III<)Il. LIII\er
and client can ncgotiatc over the lengths tl) II hlc'h thc 1:I\I\'er IS COllll1ll!ted to proc<:ed
in the matter. 111C lawl'er and clien!. lor (\,ll11rle. l11al :I!!rcc Ilnl Ihe
cr will
undertake represcntation short of litigallon (lr tlmJu!!h the lifst dppc:iI The la\l\'er
and client may negotiatc the hrcadth of Ihe !:lI\ler's service. TilCl 111:11 :l!!rcc. for
example, that the lawyer will he responsihle tor
matters reLilil1!! to the clicnt's
sale of his ongoing husiness. hut not thc tax Cl0l'ccts or the tram'lctIOIl.
Id. Similar concepts apply in other fields. Cr Carleton \, Tortosa. 17 Cal. Rptr. ~d 7]-1, 741
(Cal. CI. API'. 199:'\) (statin!! that where an inlcstor executed seleral agrecments. which
advised him that a real estate broker's duties did not include gil in!! advicc on tax consequences. the broker owed no dut\' to minimi/e :Idlerse laX con,equcnces): s('e also RITEX. DISCIPU:"ARY
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la\\ver
mav- agree to undertake a simple isolated task, such as the
lllere filing of a document. At the other extreme, the lawyer may
consent to provide a wide array of services, including, for example,
the rendering of advice on all legal issues affecting an individual or
entity, or the management of a myriad of forms of dispute resolution. Bet\veen the extremes, there are infinite possibilities concerning the scope of the lawyer's undertaking. Thus, before one
can determine what a lawyer must do in order to perform properly,
it is necessary to first ascertain the nature of assignment.
Within the scope of the representation, whether it be large or
smalL the client is entitled to first-class treatment, meaning the
lawyer must place the client's interests above all others. Within
lllat sphere. the attorney owes a client a panoply of demanding duties. including. among others. full loyalty. complete confidentiality,
diligence. and competence. Anything that threatens to interfere
with the lawyer's performance of duties within the scope of representation is a potential or actual conflict of interest that requires
special precautions or withdrawal. l ' h
However. lawyers have no obligation to advance the interests of
clients falling outside the scope of the representation.I'Y! They have
~

'i I I n.\lFl'T (THIRD) ()F THE LAW GOV!·R:-;I:-;,; LIII\TRS ~ 1<) cmt. 0 (::000) (stating "[tlhe
,cope of a representation may properly change during a representation. and the lawyer
111<11 sometimes he ohligated to oring changes of 'co pc to a client's noticc"): id. ~ 19 cmt. c
(Ii,ting "file safeguards" that apply to contracts limiting the scope or ohjectives of a
representation ).
19~. See \fOIlIL Rl LLS ()f PROf 'I CO'I)( ( I R. 1.7 cmt. ~ (21l()2) (stating that "[e]vcn
\1 here there is nn direct adverseness. a conflict (\1' InterC'it e,ISh if there is a Significant risk
llut a lawver's ahilitl' to considcr. recommcnd nr CII'!I out an appropriate course of action
fur the client will he materialll limited as J rc:sult of Ihl' Id\\'\l'r\ oth"r responsihilities or
Intcrests" ).
199. Sl,' \facmher Eng·g. Inc I. Roh'ion 8:. \filler.'+7 F.Jd 25.'. ::::'\6 (~th ('ir. 1995)
(hulding that a m,tll'racticc claim failcd hecausc thc negltget1t conduct alleged fell outsidc
thc scope of th" attornc\-client relationship): Sl'illlnaus \ Larkin. Hllffman. Daly, and
Lindgren. L.td ...'6:-\ :\.W.2d 395. y)~ (\linn (1.\pp. 19~.~) (i'inding that summary judgment \\as pmpeTh i2rantcd against a cii"nt\ lll,ilpr,lctlcc claim "ilh re:'I,cct III a matter that
fell outside the scope: of thc attorney-clicnl rc'ld!l(llhhlp): Klai2er I.
<)66 S.W.2d
77. ~3 (Tex. r\pp.~-San Antonio 19<J6. no \\1'111 (holding that a law fim) did not assume
duty to ,upef\lse a client\ entire "medical care' bI virtue ()f ih rderLiI" of the client to a
hre:a,t wrgeon. e\cn if the law firm dirccted lhc h,lI1dling uf ,ilicunl' Implants and tissue
samples as elldc:nce for usc in implant litigillion). Oil rl'ilCill'lllL; /11 /Jilrl. <J57 S.W.::d K:'i2
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1<)<)6. writ dcnied): Armor I. Lantz. Y15 S.E.2d 737. 7.+7 (W. Va.
20(0) (stating that "West Virginia authority 'iuppurls the notion that a lawyer's duty may
he limited hI' the tcrms of the attorney-client relationship"): RfSL\lU.1!c'Jl (Tfllf·(i)J OF
11l1. LII\ G()\Ff-(:-;I'<; LI"YIRS ~ 16 cmt. c (21)()()) (stating that .. !t]he laWler's duties are
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not been hired to perform those tasks. and it would be unfair to
impose such obligations on them in the absence of either a wellestablished customary practice or an agreement with the client accompanied. in the usual case. by compensation,::'IH) Consequently.
the professional obligations of attorneys-the duties that exceed
those generally owed by members of the public to one anothernormally extend no further than the scope of the work the Ia\vyer
has been asked to handle.::'1I1
More specifically. the disclosure obligations of attorneys do not
extend to all matters regardless of hem remote or tangential to the
task at han(.1. Rather. those duties are limited to the scope of the
representation. They include only information bearing lIpon the
legal services the lawyer has been asked to prmide and information acquired during the performance of the work.
As to other

ordinarii\' limlkd l<l maltlT, cmered lw the repl.e"l'l1latloll"): (;1 (III RI , C. H \/,\I{Il. JR.
J-j( )Ill.\. TilL L\I\' ()J L"" I FI", :'-32 (3d cd, 2ll(1) (l[krillg an illustration showing that a Ll\\\'er O\\'Cs a client no ubllgation "fur matters uutslde: the: scope of
that emplovment"): I R()',\1.1l E. \lALI.l'- l\: JIIIFEY M, S:l.IIII1. LH;,\L \,;j.\LI'I{,\(IICI
~ S.l (:,th cd, 20()O) (stating that "ltlhe liabilit\' (1\ lhe attorne\, depends on whether a duty
was breached that was reasonablv within the scnpe 0\ the employment"): see also State \,
Layton. -132 S.E.2d 7-10. 756 (1993) (stating that "I t 10 prnail on a claim that counsel acting
in an advisor\' or Dther limited capacity ha, rcnlkred indfc:cti\e a"i,;tance. a ,elf-repre,ented ddendant I11U,t 'ihm\' that counsel failed to I'crform competentI\' lvi/hill lill' lillliler/
scope
file dlllil'.1 iI,\\ft;l1ei/ {() or US.IlIlIled hi ('''11111('/''), The scope elf repl-e"enlalion is,uc
in legal l11alpraclll'l' i, .,imilar to the scope 01;1 \'()Iuntan unlkrtaklIH2 i"ue' lhat arises in
many tort C<l,es, SCI' <;olcralll' \'1'('1 'I R, J(lII'-'()' e\: AI. I ' (;1 " . Sit 1l11' I'- A\III"( I ' T()i<1 L.\\I -rq-~h (2d cd, 1l)<)9) rdi,cu"'!lC2 e\I'e,)'
2()(), See t;1 '>II Ri, C 1"1\/,\1(11 . .II{, 8: \\, \\11 I 1\\1 J-j( JIll \, 1'111 L\\\ 'll L.\\\' , II{
& \V. WII,I.I.\\I

or

clients normal" ,illluJd bc able to agree that lile 1;I\I\cr 1\111 commit more or Ie,s time and
energ\ 10 the client '\ cause. assume I11llre or k,' re'p(lIlsihilit\'. and general<.: more or k,,,
in the \\a\' of kgal kL""),
201. SCC' JO'iepil \, Sute ..' S, \V,3d 627. (,.-;'J I leI.
\14th 1),,1. I 1999. no
peL) (,tating. IllCldcntal to il\ rejection of an Illc.'lfcct!\e a\SlStance ul C(IUllse'l claim in II
criminal case. lhat "Itlhe nalure of the attelrllcl-cllel1l relalion,hlJ' deline" an Illlume\';,
duties and the pruk,slOnal senices 10 he rcnde'red" I: \1'1' ,i/w SOlll1Lln I , (ioll'!, \;(l, 1):'-9.,OOOOx-C\'. 199.) \\L 4027-10. at "9 (Tex, App,-Dallas Oct. n, IYt).,. Ill) IHlt) (not lic:siL'nated f(lr puhlication) (stating that ,,[\\ Ihik the ,cnpe uf a confidcntlal relalionship Ib~
tween the attorne\ and client] is hroad. the le,as Supreme ('ourt has placed certain
general limitations uplln the hrcadth of a fidUCIal.\' \ dutv"),
2()2, See \1(1)11 Rl us ()I PROf'l CO'lll ( I R, 1.6(a) (2IJ02) (indicating that. With
limited exceptions. "\a] lawyer shall not re\'eal information rdating to the representalion
of a client unless the client gin;s informed COIbent"). It is generally agrec:d that the client
has the right to exercise: control over the confidentiality of information that the lawyer
acquires while \\'orking on the client's case.
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infnrmation falling outside the scope of the representation, the
lawver has discretion as to how those facts should he handled, The
all,;rney may elect to communicate those facts or may choose not
tn do so, There is no legally enforceable duty to disclose to the
client information outside the scope of representation.
Similarly. with only limited exceptions. co , when the representation terminates. the special duties that commence \\ith the inception of the attorney-client relationship come to an end.2()~ "A
lawyer has no general continuing obligation to pass on to a former
client information relating to the former representation. "cO"

~o-'.

S"e RI ,I \11 \11:--'1 (THIRD) ()I 1111 L \11 (j,,\ I R'I'(; L\\\\I R, ~ .j" (~OOO) (disth..: duti..:s il1cide'lltal to krmillation of ,I .Illmlle\-Cliellt rel,lli(lll,llIp-)uch as takin~ interim step) to protect client inkrest;, ,Inei rl'lurnill~ cliellt prupcrt\. 'n1": dutv of
clHlfidcntialil\ ,ur\i\cs the t..:rmination ()I thl' ,lllmlle\-clicnt re'lalioll,hlp. See irl. ~ JJ
Cillt. C (Slalin~ Ihal "Ialla\\'\cr"s ohli~alion t(\ l'miL'l'l Iill' cunficie'llcc, (,1,1 l·liellt . . cOlltinUe' after th..: representation ends"). rhoc I) dh(, ,I 1I:11llCei dut\ to l'lll1\C\ IIllnr1l1atiol1 to a
lurm..:r clicnt. Accordin~ tu thc RcsUlL'lllelll:
cu'sln~

.-\fter tnmmation a law\..:r mi~ht r,,:cCI\(' a IWIIC,'. kiter, or ulher Clll11111UllICIIlllil intcnded lor a for!11..:r cli..:n!. The lawyer l11ust lhe' reasonahle "Ifuns to forward the
c0l11l11unication.1l1e lawyer ordinarii v must ;tho Inform the source ullhe communication that the lawver no I()n~er rcpresents the former client
111e lawyer must
lik"wise notify a form"r client if a third person s..:..:ks to obtain material relating to the
r..:pr..:sentation that is still in the lawver's custody.
~

JJ cm!. h.
20-+. SCI' Keck, 'vlahin & Catc \. :\at'l ('Illon Fire IllS. Co .. 20 S.W ..'d 6<)2. 6<)<) n.3
(lex. 20(0) (rclatin~ that th..: presumption that II hU'olnc'S\ transaction h<:lllecn a lawver and
client is invalid on the part of th..: lawvcr \Iould IWI dPpl\ "had Ciranada ,e\cr..:d the attorne\-clicnt relatiomhip "ith K:VIC and hired l1e\1 ,lItOrl1e,S helmc d~rc'ein~ to thc rcka,>e"): H,ill \. StephellSon, 919 S. W.~d -+'\-+ . .jh'; (Tc:x. A,pp.--Fmt Worth 1<)96. writ
denied) (statin~ that "a k~al injun cannol ()CClIr .lller 'h..: dt!Orllc'\-cllent r"lalionshlp ha'>
ended bccause the dtWrn,,\ has no duty to thl' (I'ell[ ,:1 Ih<ll pOint"): ,( I .i(hl.l'll SI(W"
C()'I\II~I.\RIIS ()' E\)I II, ./IRISI'RI l)f~( I ~ ,~111.1 II:i!' 'J. IK771 ('oldtll1~ Ihat allhough
a bargain hd\leen a principal and a~cnt I\ill hc '<.'1 a'ilic ilthe agent hd'o e'ollCeakd facts
within his kn()wled~e that mi~ht mllue lCe the lud"l11l'nl ()f his pnnclpal. "If th..: relation of
principal and a~ent has \\ IlOllv ceased, the partk" <Ire restor..:d to th":lr Clllll1110n competencY to deal with each other"): Stele :v fcC 'onllll"(.\. Ruh\ 11 Bi~el,,\\, 1,'1111111/,1/'1
Ue(,(,111
[)('IC/O[!III(1fiS ill '{('.\iI.1 Le~{// Jfulpl'lldlCe f,illI, .~.~
\! \In', 1...1. h07. h.~.j (~()1)2) (.,!;ttin"
that "lain attornc\-client relationship generallY lcrlllllLlIC, Urlln Ihe C()[l1l'ic:tIOIl ulthe pur'pose of thc emplmmcl1!' Thu,. ,I hreach lli' fldu,·l.lr\ dUll canll(l[ be 1'.I'l'c! l,,>lm conduct
suhsequent to thc CUJ11plctioll of the purpo\c ()I lile Cmplll\ ment"!.
:'O:'i. RI'SI,\II \11.'1 (TIIIRI)) (li 1111 L\\\ ("1\1 ,,'I", l.\\I'1 R' ~,'.' cm!. h eO()U).
Howeyer. the Rcstate'l11ent ~o..:s Oil to Ilote:
Id.

"i

or

111c lawver might. hO\vc\cr. have such an ubligallllll if th..: la\\\er continues [() re-

present the client in other matt..:rs or under a C(lntillull1~ relationship. Whether such
an ohli~ation exists r..:garding particular inlornUlion dep..:nds un such factors as the
cli..:nt's reasollahlc cxpectations: the seop..:. ma"nitude, and duration of the client-Iaw-
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In Soliman v. Goltz, a case using the phrase "absolute and perfect candor," the court said that "fiduciary duties extend only to
dealings within the scope of the underlying relationship of the parties. "206 The invocation of that rule was undoubtedly correct. Although, as indicated above, the court may have erred in applying
the rule to the facts of the case, the legal principle that the court
sought to employ is an appropriate and well-established norm in
the law of attorney conduct.~()7

B.

M aterialiE}'

Courts have repeatedly recognized that the fiduciary obligations
of an attorney require disclosure of facts that are material to the
representation.~l)s The implication of these expressions is that immaterial facts need not be disclosed. Such a construction is consistent with the fact that. even in the case of intentional
misstatements, liability is imposed under the 1,1\\/ of deceit only if
materiality is established. 20')
In a recent Minnesota decision, the issue of materiality was
squarely addressed. In STAR Centers, Inc. v. Faegre & Benson,
L.L.P.,·210 the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a grant of sum-

yer relationship: the evident significance of the: information to the: clie:nt: the: burde:n
on the lawyer in making disclosure: and the likdihood that the client will receive the
information from another source.
Id.

206. Soliman Y. C;oltL '\0. O:;-9.1-OO()()S-CV. Il)l}~ \\1. .l1)~7_+O. dt'l) (T-"'x. App.~Dal
las Oct. 6. 199.1. no \Hill (not designated for publicatl( \I)).
207. See Part Ill-A supra (discussing Ronkilli.
20S. See, e.g .. Willis \. Maverick. 760 S.W,2d h·C ()·t'" (Tex, Il)SS)
that
"[aJs a fiduciary. an attorne\' is obligated to render a full ~lnd lair disclosure 01 fach m~lte:
rial to the client's representation"): Crean v. ChollCI-;, -1-4 S.W.2d hi. 62 (Tex,
Antonio 19S6. writ ref'd n.r.e.) (stating that "Itlhe alltlrll<.:\ client rci:ltlon,hip IlllP()SC'S un
the attorneY' a duty to di,cluse facts mall:rial to his rCI'l'cSen[;[tion"),
209. See Vincent Relhert Johnson. Fraud (/1/(/ neeI'll, /1ic/II"ill~ \"t.;ligelll (Inri /IIIIOCm[
.flvfisrepreSenllllioll ~ I.O.i171. ill PI [-(S( lc;\L !-sJlln' :\, II, )'s. DI II "I s. [) \ \1 \(,[ S I I 'JSS I
(defining materialit\). This chapter ,tales:
Virtually all common la" forms of relief based on mlsrCpreselltatl(lll reljuirc that the
statement relate: to a material fact. A material lact Is one tel \\ hich a reasonahle person would giVe! some \Veight in making a decision: it need not he the sole or predominant factor in the recipient's deCISion making proces\,
Id. (citations omitted): sec a/so id. ~ 1.().1[11 (stating that "an action Will not lie in the absence of some perversion of material factual data chargeabk to the defendant").
210. 644 N.W.2d 72 (Minn. 20(2).
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mary judgment in favor of a law firm." 1 The suit alleged kgal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty. hut the court found that the
undisclosed information was not material to the firm \ representation of the plaintiff.2 12 The plaintiff in STAR Centers asserted that
its law firm knew that it sought information about the viability of a
lender known as Consortium. eLl Through certain dealings. the firm
learned that Consortium denied a loan to another entity. but did
not communicate that information to the plaintifFI~ In holding
that the nondisclosure would not support an action for hreach
fiduciary duty. the court wrote:

ot'

[TJhat a lender refused to fund a loan. without more. reveals nnthiniL
material about the lender. To a prospective borrower. the rei/SOilS
for the lender's refusal are what matters .... There is no evidence in
the record that Faegre learned why Con~mtiul11 refused to fund the
loan .... Finally. there is no evidence in the record that FaeiLre knew
about Consortium's lending practices.
. Therefore. reilStll1able
minds can reach only one conclusion: that the informati(lll LleiLre
obtained about Consortium from Cem,na\ inquiry did not ctlnstitute
a material matter bearing on its representation of STAR.' I';

Unreliable information is one type of information that may be
found to lack materiality. In STAR Centers, the law firm had defended Consortium in a previous law suit. 216 In furthering its discussion, the court reprinted a portion of an affidavit by the
plaintiffs attorney in the prior case attesting to the law firm's
knowledge of Consortium's financial strength. 217 The affidavit
stated:
Shortly after Faegre made its first appearance on behalf of Consortium in the case, Denver Golfs attorney told Faegre that he "thought
Consortium may have engaged in fraud." He also told Faegre that
he did not believe that Consortium had sufficient eapital to fund all
of its commitments. He sought :nformation that might suhstantiate

211. STAR C"nt"rs. Inc. \. Fa"gr" & B"ns()ll. ILl' h-l-l \:.W.2J
21:'. Id
2 U. Id at 77 n.:'.
21-1. Id
~15. !d Cit 77-7'6.
216. STAR eelliers. 644 N.W.2J Cit 75.
:'17. ld. at 75-76.

7' -";1

\1111!1- 20(2).
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his belief that there was a misrepresentali\lI1 111 CO'lsonium's hrochure, and did not assert that he had such pronL:>I"

In the subsequent malpractice suit one issue was whether it was a
breach of fiduciarv dutv for the law firm not to disclose that information to STAR. since STAR \vas interested in Consortium's viability as a lender. 21 ' i Focusing on the unreliable nature of the
information, the court concluded that the law firm had not
breached its fiduciary duties. cC () It wrote:
To determine whether the oral allegations (\1 fraud constituted information that was material to Faegre's rel'r~",entation of STAR, we
must analyze them within their context. Fir"l. Demer (Jolf and Consortium were litigating a claim that Consortium hre{lchec\ a contract
hy refusing to fund a loan. Denver Goll"o; cUl11plaint did not allege
fraud. Second, there is no evidence in the reeord that Denver Golf
offered evidence to support its allegation'.. (\f fraud. The attorney
mentioned fraud in the context of a re4ul.'''t lor information to support his helicf that Consortium engaged in tr:lUd .... Without some
evidence to support the oral allegations. Fae,J e had no reason to
think that thcy \vC're anything hut litigatiun tactics. and reasonahlc
minds can conclude only that the unsuhstantiated allegations of
fraud wcre not material to Facgrc's representation of STAR. Therefore, we hold as a matter of law that Faegre did not learn information
that was matcrial to its representation of STAR from the oral allegations of fraud. I
00

In other contexts, courts have similarl\ recognized that unreliable information need not be disclosed. Thus, courts have held that
securities laws requiring revelation of m,ltcrial facts do not require
dissemination of unreliable and speculati\l' infn n nation.::'22

'IS. hi. at 7S.
219. M at 77.
22(). fd at 7S.
221. STIR (,'1/[,'1'1. h44 :\.\\.2J :It 7S lcilallun ,'ll,lllc:d I
'"
Scc Garcia \. (',)rei,lIl!. 'n() F.2d S26. :'-"U (111[11 ('11' 1\)91!

(11\)ldin~ lilallhl.' inf,,!'·
mlltJ(lI1 al i~sul.' \\<\, lou unrellahle' and ~pI.'CUlali\c' III h:'lllllterial" under Rule I()h·). and
li1u, lhe defendant had no dUI\ to discl()~e ~uch Illl()rrlllltJ()!l to ,11lIrelwldeh helm.:
pllrcha,ill~ Iheir stock): ct: Arnold \. Soc", lor Sl\\ Blillc'(lrp. Inc .. h.~(1 A2d 1271l. 1::'<'-)0·<'-)1
(Dc!. 199.+) (noting that the Ill\\ doc, not require the dircctllrs ur a cmpol'llliun to di,ciose
"inlll.'rellth unrcliahk or ,peculati\c informatiun \\Illch \\ould tend tll cl)nfuse stockhold·
ers or inundate them wilh an o\er\oad of informlltilln." hut holding thai 111 light of partial
and incomplete disclo,ure uf historical information additional discltbure was required).
The court aho staled that "disclosure of an unreliahle share \aluation can. under some
circumstance,. constitute material misrepre'>entation.O< fd at I'::S.'\.
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Support for a materiality limitatiun l)f1 the duty uf "absolute and
perfect candor" can be drawn from the far removed field of reinsurance. The doctrine of lInerrinw tidt's. vvhich as discussed above
is defined as requiring "absolute and perfect c<1ndor."22' has been
held to apply in that context. "Many courts [dealing with reinsurance issues]. hm\ever. do not treat this duty to disclose as absolute.
but. instead. analyze the materiality of the facts at issue. together
with the circumstances surrounding the non-disclosure or
misrepresenta tion. "22-1

C.

Clien ( K/UJIt'/edge

An attorney is not liable for failing to reveal facts of which the
attorney has no knowledge. 22 :i Conversely. there IS no dut\' to dis::'::'3. See Siale: I. B:lke:r, :""l) S.W.::'J -'6'7, ,~-j r k\. CII .. -\I'I'.-~.\Lhlin I'rh, Ilrit rd'd
n.r.e:.) (per cun:lm) (c:\pl:linin~ "lIr/J,'rrilllll/ili('\ I ' "'[tlhe il1(hl :lhunJ:lnt go()d laith: ah,,)lllIL' and perlc:cl canci()r (l!' upe:nnc." and h()lh."ll. tile ahr,ellce ()i am L'll 11 cL':iI T11L'n t (l!'
licce:ptioll, 11011e:\er ,light''').
:':'-1. John S. DI:lconi" l'1IIlU.I[ (;o()Ii !-{1I11i 'Illri /("('i\II()il: \Oll,/h.lr-/ulllr('
\Ii/I('no/
!-i1er.1 il/ RI'II/I'II((/I/('(' Al!,rCel/l('/II,I, ill 7:"6 (>/<.\( 11,1'-" f..\11 h\1111 II: C'l\I\II.!H'l11 L\\I
\ ,.;[) PR\( III'!. C()/ I{\I H.·\'-.IlIH)( JK SFRlh ~,~,~, 266 (1'll)7 J, i/\ui/ahle al \\'L 7:"6 lOLl
CO\I\I :':":": sec also Stuart Colton, Cimosl Good hlilh-f-i)//Ol\' IIii' /-()rlllll('.I, liIe Thcon'lIlld
llie Rl'i/lill': lriwi are IIii' IlIIplic{f{iol1s (or Cedclll.I (/1/1/ Ii)/' ReinslIrl.'r{', in PI{V"II\I'" LA\\
hsnll II·.: C"\I\lIl{(I . \L L\\\ ,\'-Il PR.\( I III ("II RSL H·\'-.IlIH)()K SI'RILS 193, 19~
(1999), illtII/(/Ii/e al WL 793 PLL'C()\I\.1. 193 (
that "an insurer \e:eking reinsurance:
co\erage has all ul1ljualifie:d dUI\ to make full dnd ,Iccurate disc!()Surc of all facts material
to thc risK. i.e., tho.,c facts tllat a re:imurancc unlknHltcr would norl11alh Ilani to consicic:r
when e\alu:lling \\he:lhcr to as'iUmc cmcragc"): 1':IlJl:1 Hamilton Le:c, (nllil/~ Ihe (lori/ran
A.·//O{ alld ()/)l'IIII/~ [',illi/"l'll" Bo.\': The .\('cd 'or '.1 (1IIIi}/'II/ /-"Iiel'lll .\lilr/1II111' HiliI' ill
('hcrflllLle: Fide:I "ilh i{CI/,e('{ {() i/arille 1111/11'<111,,'. !'I l'l I. \1 \1(. L.J. -III. -III (1')'),'1 1,1ir"
cur,r,ing dut\ of iul! ,hclu,urL' and ,l<ltmg that "cI i.!c'l IS cOlhldered Ill:liCflal II. ·tl) a prudent in,urer. Ih e\I'otcncl' would affect de:CI''!llll' ,'II ik rhi-; :I,sl!l11ed'''): John P. Killan:lgh.
Jr .. "A.lk .\11' \Ii (jlli'.ll/O/ll <Il1d 1'// Idl YOII .\() tj,"
fhe!' '('11'1111' ot l herril11:1e hdc:111I
\llIrill(, /11.\111'11/1('" li'iI/lII/Cl/iJ/ll, 17 Tl L. \1.\1{. L..J .~-. -l() (1992) ('t:tlln~ "the :h,ured IllU\l
inform the lllldel'\\fllc'fs oi all kll\l\\l1 11,cltertal LICh "hleh influence (Jr alfrXI Ihe Ilhurcd
ri,k" )
22:". S,'" \\rl~hl I. Lel\ir" 777 S.\\.::'d ~~II. '~~,2 .' ( k \ . .'\I'I'.~C(lrplb CiHl,ti 1t):N,
IHit de:ni"d) (h()lciing th:ll. he:C:llI.,e: there II.!, I,,) ,'I I,Ie nL'!.' IILll ,I 1,1\I\er ~Ilell ,lhe)lIl :1
Illisde:rneallor plc:1 h:lr0.'llIl, the:rc: \\:IS nu dutl t() d'."·:Osl' liliit Inl,li'I1Ul,'lnl: ,<'I' iI/\(I ,-\ilill'
:lll'ci CUlllputcr S,T\\. .. Inc. I. Ka,mlr & Kr:lc'c I 1..1' .. '\(1. 1),~-c);;,11i)22-,C\, .21)(li) \\1.
I 7[):'6,':" , at-l n~\.
'\0\. I.", ~()lj(i. re\ 11'\1 denied I (Iwt ,lcsl0.11:!kd I,ll' pllhllcation) (
that:

ur

IAlt the timc the c,ctlicmcllt chan II:lS prel,:!re,!
Ithe 1:11\ II rIll I did not i-;1l()\1 ui the
p(ltl'ntial e\pur,ure to the ri\r.; million dolldr nui,'
I:lncil c()uid Iwt hall' dl,cl(he:d Ih
intention to colieci on the fill' million JoiliH Illlte[.I ... once !the firml k:nnCLi of the:
changed circumr,tance:s, it had a duty to di,cl()'>e: all information rdel'ant to Ithel
repre:'>e:ntalion ).
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close information that is alreadv known. -nle latter rule. rooted in
commonsense and efficiency. is applied throughoLlt the law. cch
Thus, a doctor is not compelled by the informed-consent doctrine
to warn a patient of risks that arc already understood.'" Nor IS a
possessor of land ordinarily obliged to disclose dangers that arc
"known or obvious. ".:'.:'ii
The same rule applies in the context uf lawyer-client relations.
for little would be gained by mandating disclosure of information
already possessed by the client. To be sure. there will be cases
where there are questions as to what the client "knows." and there
will be instances where it is fair to conclude that what the client
"knows" the client fails to appreciate adeLjUalely.22'1 In sllch situa-

Of course. if th" attorn,,\, through th" exercis" of rc',I"lii.lhk eire ,I1,)uldl1:I\c' KIl()I\[l Ihe
information in lju"stiol1. th" attorn"I' rna\' h" ,l!c'd 1,)1' ill.llpraCllce, 1l,l\\eler. 111 ,ucil Ill'
stances. th" attornev's deLlul1 is more proper'" Ylc'llc,d :h a hreach ()I Ihe dUll ()I cillnpe,
t"nce. rather than as a fad un: (() disclose.
2:::h, See. e.g,. Honncutt v. Kendall. :'i~9 F. Supp, Sl)~. ,'-:Il:'\ (D, Dc:I I lJ1)2) (recogn lIing
the duty of an insurer to a client): QuintanJ v. T"nn, FarmCfs \fllf. 1m. Co .. 77-1 S,\\,,2d
h30. h34 (Tenn. Ct. App. 19/)'1) (stating that "an linsurance) agent has no duty to in/orlll a
client of a policy's cancellation if the client knew or SllllUld have knol'l-n or Ihe cancellalion
by other means"): Salinas v, General Motors Corp .. 1)'-;- S.W.:::d ')~~. 950 (Tex. App,-Houston [1st Dist.] 1')93. no writ) (holding that Glr manufacturers have no dUll' to warn
elderly drivers about the known risks of driving while Illlpilired or incompetent. or 10 II'Mn
car dealers about the known risks of selling cars to InCllll1pl'lc:nt drill'r\),
227. See, e,g .. Yeates Y. Harms, 393 P,2d 91C. 991 (K,lll. 1%-1) (reieCliIH! an ar~uml'llt
th<lt would have reljuin:d phl'sirians to warn of kllllllil l'I\~S): Scolt I, Brddl()rd. h()h P,:'d
55~, :'i5~ (Okla. IY~O) (st,lIing that "It]here is no need 10 d",,'I,he risks thai eHilc'f' ilu"hl 10
he Known hy evenone ur are alread\' kl10wn to Ihe P,III<.:I1I"),
2:::S, See RESI\II \11'0,1 (Sll'I)'o,I») III '['(WIS ~ .~.l; \11 1 e\. Cillf. e I I ',IllS 1 (,I:illilg Ihill
"Ir]casonable care (In Ih" Pdrt o( the possessor, , d,)e, 11(\1 (lrcill1arlil rc'qulre 1'!'eCauII(\J1,.
or "I"n warning. agail1.sl dangers which are Known 10 the 11'1101'. or ,u ,liol IOUS te) 11lIn Ih,ll
he mal' he expected to dlscmer thcm"): ICe al),) BrollnS\ ilk '\avlgalllHl 1)1"[, I, I/I~lllrrl'.
S2<) S.\V.2d IS<). 16() (Tcx. 1<)9:') (holdi[]~ thai in d C~J'e \Ihc:re ~I 1I':Ilil'r (\Il'riurnc'd ,,11Iil'
parked on mudd\' "oti. :1 landlord had llO dutl 10 Ildrll ,,I'()UI lilc' r"~, l"heLl hI "pl:lil1
dirt" )
:::29. Cr RISI,llfl'll 'o,j (Tlll"I)) ()I Ifli till (,'>\I!!"['o,,; L\II"I{S ~ ~II (1111, l'
(20()O) (commenling on Ihl' ""IIc:r's dutv 10 cumuli), I !;\' l'()I11I11l.'1l1 ,Idlc" 111,11'
'Ille lavlyer's LIuty [() COilsult goes hcvond dispatc'l1l11 IIlI()I'Il];ilIOIl 10 Ihe cllell!. l'llc'
lawver must. when appropriale'. inquire about the cllellt', ~1l()\1'
Idls. ,Illd c'on,
cern'> ahout thc matter. and must he open to dl'CUS\l'111 01 Ihe approl'flale course of
aClion, A law\'cr should not necc\sarilv ",sume th:iI ,I ellc'nt 1\ i,he, I() pn,"is :111 Ihe
client's rights to the linlil. reg;lrdks;, of cost or Imp:lcl (\11 'llhers, . , , /:lel1 If a clic:nl
fails to rl'ljuest information. a law\,cr mal' he ohl
10 he fmlhc0l11lng h"callse the
client may hc unaware or the limits of th" client's kno,vkdge. Similarlv. new and
unforeseen circumstances ma\ indicate that a lawvcr SllllUld ask a clienl 10 reconSider
a r"quest to hl' Idt uninformed.
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tions, the lawyer must err on the side of full disclosureYo But
within a certain range of cases it is possible to conclude that the
facts in question are both known and appreciated, and if that is
true the duty of "'absolute and perfect candor" does not require
disclosure.
D.

Conzpeling Obligalions [() ()filers

Lawyers normally serve many clients, simultaneously and sequentially. Obligations of confidentiality are owed to all of those
persons. even after the termination of an attorney-client relationshipYI Sometimes the duties of confidentiality to one client contlict with disclosure obligations to another. A complex body of law
relating to conflicts of interest gmerns how such cases must be
handled. In the most extreme case. ethics rules require the lawyer
to decline or withdraw from proposed or existing representation,
rather than breach confidentiality,
Hmvever. there is never a

Iri.
230. CI \j"'.ROL H. FRIFD'IA'..l''.1l1 P'I \'-1)1'.<; L\\\YIR.': EIIII"S)'J (1990) (stating that .. the lawver's role in the decisionnni-.:ill).' process is not a passile nne. On the
contrary. the lawver should 'exert his hest effort<., to Ie Insure that decisions of his client are
made only after the client has heen informed of relevant considerations"').
231. See, e.g, /11 re Roseland Oil & Gas. Inc hI-: S.W.3d 71-:4, 7R8 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001. no pel. h.) (statin).' that "re/lients, current and former. have a reasonahle expectation that the information provided to an allornc\' in a professional sellin).' IS confidential
in nature"): SCI' ({Iso Summerlin v. Johnson, :n:; S.E.2d X79, I-:XI (Ga. Ct. Ai'I'. 19X:'i) (statin).' that "ft/he ohlig.ation to presCfve confidenccs continues aflt:r cmplOll1lcnt is tcrminilled"): Rrsl.\II\IISI (TIIIRD) or 111I L\II C")\IR'-I'-." L\\\'dR' ~ .i3 cmt. c (2()()())
!Stating. tilal "1~ljla\\\er's ohlig.ation to prole'c'l thl' confidences ()f a clicnt
. contll111eS
aflt:r the represcntation ends").
232. SI'( III /'(' Roselalld Oil '" GIIS. III, .. "'\ S.\\.3d at 7:-;:-\ (ordcrin).' lihqualliication
hccause the allornel lIas "in a precarious [''''Itl'l!l III "hlch ill' mal hc forcc'd to n1:l~c the
cilOlce hetwc<.:i: Icalousl, rcpresenting. hi' cllenl..; and Illdlfltaillln).' the l'(lilfidcntilliitv of
information rcceiled from his former CIICllt'''): Llh :-\ng.cles Count\ Fklr ,\s';n Ethics
Comm. Op . .+63. h LII\. \\ \'-.. PIWll ,)'.I)[ ( I '+~l) ([')'Ji) (requlrin).' withdr;mill unless the
law\'(:r ohtains cOllsellt from a former client), di,,'!I\led ill e,l ('II RI\ C. 11 V IRI), .IlL &
W. \VIi II \\1 H, 'Il! S. '1'111 L \11 ,)[ L\II \ I I"'.', c)-'ll) ililh. '1-.' Lid cd. ~1j(111: (/ I knriben
I. (;re~ll Am. S,II & Loan. 1.+ eli. Rptr ~d 1"-+ 1,,\1> (Cli. ('I. ApI'. I')')~I (q~JlIIl).' th~1l
conflicts rules prolect confidentialitv and th~11 1111' Iiducian nature of the dllornel'-client
relalionship all'l\\s a f()rl11er client to sed, dl"JlLlillk'~lli()1l of ~I (orl11l'i' atlorllc'\ posseS\in).'
confidenll~t1 inlornutiun that is adverse to thl' !(\rlllc'r cllc'ilt I: ,\13A ('''I11Il1. (\!l [tilKs and
Prof'1 Responsihilill', Forll1al Op. 90-3:;:-; (1l)')II) (,talln).' that "[\\Ihell the InlOrI1l~ltioll imparted hI' la/ I\ould-he c1iellt Ito whom ~l dut\ \)1 c(\nlidenllalltv is owedjl' ernical to the
representation of all e!;!"ting, or n<:'\. client ill the "a me Ilr related maller
. tile law\'er
must withdraw or decline the representation uilies., a waiver or confidenllalit\ has hecn
ohtained" ).
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duty to disclose to one client what must be held c'lnfidential to
protect another.:'3' Thus. the demands of "absolute and perfect
candor" may compel a lawyer to step aside because those duties
cannot be performed. but disclosure obligations never necessitate a
breach of confidentiality.
This point has been recognized by the American Law Institute
on various occasions. For example. in discussing a lawyer's duty to
inform and consult with a client. the commentary to section 20 of
Restatement (Third) of the Lm Governing Lawyers observes
"[s]ometimes a lawyer may have a duty not to disclose information.
for example because it has been obtained in confidence from another client or because a court order limits its dissemination. ":''-1
In a similar vein. the same Restatement opines:
A lav.:yer may deny a client's request to retrie\e. insl'L'ct. m copy
documents when compliance would \iolate the hl\\ver's dut\ to another. ... That would occur. for e\:ample. if a court's protecti\l: order
had forbidden copying of a document obtaineL c:urill~ discovery
from another party. or if the lawyer reasonably oelie\ed that the client would use the document to commit a crime . . . . Justification
would also exist if the document contained confidences of another
client that the lawyer was required to protect. 235

Similarly. the Restatement (Second) of Agency. section 381.
states that:
Unless otherwise agreed. an agent is subject to a duty to use reasonable efforts to give his principal information \vhich is rele\clIlt to affairs entrusted to him and which. as the agent has notice. the
principal would desire to have and \\hich can be cOlllllluniclted II'i{llow vio/a{ing (/ \upcrior dl/n' {() (/ third !)('!\O/l.:"'·

233. C(. \1"lll I R.l I I ~ ')1 FR' lI"! (''' .... Ill , I R. 1./ (2()li21 hUtln" lile' :.',·\1eral ("\1i'lict-()i"-inkrc'l rule I. The commcntar\ to R.ule' i - ,!elk,:
['nelcr 'Ol1h' cm:Ul1lq~lnCC' It m~I\' hc lmpo"li,k 1(\ mllKe Ih,' dl\cl'hllrc' 11,'CC,':Ir\ to
nhtain Cllll,ent. For e\ampk. \\hel1 Ihe LI\\\C'l" ,','i'rc:\enh dilTl'relll CIIL'I~h 111 rcldkd
malter, and one of the client, rcfu\e\ to con,c!]l id Ihe dl,cln'lnc' IleXl','II!\ 1,\ pcrmll
the other client III ll1i1ke an informed dCCI'lell). iilL' la\\ler elll1l1(\1 l,r"I'L'rh IhK Ihe
lalter tll con,ell\.

Iii. em!. 19.

23'+. RI
23:\ !d.

\1

~

III

\11 .... 1

(TIlIRD)

01·

1111-

LI\\

(;"\1 "'-1'-<1

L 1\\\ I

" , ~ 211

emt.

.+6 cm t. c.

2311. R"I III \II

'-I (SIT')'-I)) Of

A<>I ..... ' ,

~

.'-SI (1l):"C;) (cmpha\ls added).

d

(21)1)()).
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Consequently. obligations owed to others constrain the demands of
"absolute and perfect candor."

E.

Cliem Agreement

Within a broad range. fiduciary ohligations. including the duty of
candor. are subject to modification hy the parties to the relationship.217 111e general rule is set forth in section 376 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency. which prmides ,,[ t Jhe L',istence and
extent of the duties of the agent to the principal are determined hy
the terms of the agreement hct\\een the parties. interpreted in light
of the circumstances under which it is made .... "'"
Explaining that provision. the commentary opines:
Thus. the duties ... of care .... (li ohedience. and ... ()j' lo\alt\, . , .
[as set forth in various prmisions oi the Restatement] arL' inferences
drawn from the conduct of the parti,,'" in lig.ht or common experience
and what reasonable men reg.ard ;b Llir. TIlL' rules st;tic:d in slIch
Sections are the rules :lpplicahk t(l the normal «he. in \\ hich the
parties ha\e not made a differcnt ag.reelllent.,
IT]he ll;tnics can
make what ag.reemenls they ple;l\e.
[\\itb limited e\eel'tionsj.:'"

The principle that fiduciary parties han: the ability to vary the
terms of the relationship is also recognized in provisions of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. which in discussing the communication obligations of attorneys to clients expressly
provides "(tJo the extent thar the Iwnies ha\'e not or/zerll'ise agreed. a
standard of reasonableness under all the circumstances determines

2:)7, .'leI' \'irlL'cllt Rllhcrt Johllsoll . .\O/I('lIdt.'''1I (II {(/It rim! (/i('I1/1 h, f)"I'(/rI!lI~ /)UI'IlIers lind A'\I!('!({/(", I{)/-I, Fidl/cial,\" lind nil<
'illiln ri,,/I;/:/\, .~(I I
1', I! I RI \, I. J(I~
(19~~) (e'\:plall1lll"- that "fiJucian (\hli!,atl(lIh r,' ,ui'<,',', it) ,lliLT:III()(] ('\ L:!,,','(1ic' 11 I (Ii Ih,~
parties in\ohe'd" IlnJ ciiscussi(]!, Ihc appllcllt!(\ll "I Ihell I-doc' I() [,I\\\ers ch;!()~I!l~ 1,111 IlrIlh).
2J~, Rr \I \11\11 ' I (St ((I'll) (ll ,-\(01 , . ') ~;-h (I(!~,~I: \('C (//'" \:t)1 lie' ":11111' \
Bank 0/ AI11, "at'J Irusl & SIl\-\SS .,. 2~1 (':11, RI'lr _~,~(), .~_~I ((';11, (1'\1'1' I <},-;SI (Sl.III(]"that a "bank'~ LIllI: ~h a~cnl I" liJllitL'd In Ih,: 'L{Jj'L' III 111\.' ,1~L'lll': ,,>\..'11\\]"\)] ill 11k' !l~!rtil"''''
ag.rccnlL'!1l" ),
2.'19, RI SI \11 ' I I " (SI' " ' " l 1)1 ,,\ • .1 'that -;uch a~1.rL·l'n1'-\111" h""'{\\l'CJ1 till. ' 1],lrliL'\ \\Pili.! 'l(lt b<--' ,-'ll!(Il"I..'L',!hL. ' ulhl,-"
In CI)l11l11cnt h_ \\ illeil 1'1'(\\ Ilks:
Thc <i!'cnl's JUtle'S IllII\ he Ilfkclc'd 1'1 lil,. ill.'~,!II!\ 'li thl' ,'IllI,I(), 1ll,'I1!.

1,\

11-,,' Llc'! 111,(1

he Ilr tilc prll1Cllo lil hll>; hc'cn IrllUdulcllt. 111 \\I1:,il C,lsC thl' ruk, "c'I1,':-III\ "i'I,I(l',ii'k 11\
the' dkcI
Irauduie'111 c()l1ciuCl prellll!: (\i' h 'he' L!et Il1<lt (Iill' ()I IhL 1',lrill" i' '(lhiLCI
In a lbahilit\ or ha.s all iJ11IllUIlII\' frol11 1lllhill!\ III the' (HilL'!',

nr

Id. cm!. h (citation, "Illlltcd),
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the appropriate measure of consultation. "2-10 More specifically,
section 19 states: "( 1) Subject to other requirements stated in this
Restatement. a client and lawyer may agree to limit a duty that a
lawyer would otherwise owe to the client if: (a) the client is adequately informed and consents: and (b) the terms of the limitation
are reasonable in the circumstances. "2-11
However. there are limits on how far a lawyer and client can
alter the usual "rules of the game. ".'-12 The conduct of lawyers is
constrained by ethical obligations imposed by disciplinary codes. 2 -l 3
Such codes allow clients to waive certain protections afforded by
the rules. even though other such protections are nonwaivable. For
example. a client may consent to re\dation of otherwise confidential information 2 -l-l or various low-level conflicts of interests provided there is full disclosure and informed consent. 2-l' At the other
extreme. the safeguards afforded by the represented-person rule
generally cannot be waived by the client. 2 -1h
Other provisions of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers. strongly suggest that the disclosure obligations of
attorneys can be tailored to the needs of the client.:,r The sophistication of the client will be highly relevant as to how far the usual

2.:10. RES],\ I F\!f'd (TIlIRD) OF IIlL LA\\ Ci( )VER"iIN(i LAWYLRS ~ 20 emt. e (2000)
(emphasis added): cf Burlington N. & Santa Fe Rv. Co. v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co.,
:'i90 N.W.2d 433. -l3i'> (N.D. 1999) (holding that although "[a]gency law generallv recognizes ... [that anI agent's duties to the principal are determined hv the parties' agreement
and the nature of the fiduciary relationship[.J.
If the principal consenh to self-dealing 11\
the agent. the agent must fully and complete" disclose all relevant facts to the principal
unless the agreement provides otherwise").
:::-11. Sec RI ~I Vii \11,,1 (flllRD) 01 1111 LVII (j';\I~R'I"'; LV\\,II" ~!9 (:::01)0).
1-12. Sec Id. ~ 19 dlus ..1 eO()()) (offering (;lCh on whicl] a client's agreement "to wai\e
the requirement ni reason<lhle compdence" \1()uIJ he invalid).
:::-I~,- Sce r;(,llera//1 Vincent R. Johnson. The VIrflles lind Llillirs oj" CndcI III I_ega! F.rhIn. 1-1 ~()I!{I 0.\\11 J.L. ErlliCs & PI·Il. P()I', :~ . .29-.16 (2000) (disclls"n~ how mlles o(
IegJ! ethics foster client protection Jnl! equalit\ III client treatment).
2-1-1. See. e.g .. \j()j)11 RI lIS ()F P!{()I'I (""Ill (I R. I.h(a) (:::I)().2) (Indicating that a
client Illust gile infnrmed consent for law\er t() releal confidential iniormation) .
.2-1:'. See. c." .. \f(Jllll RI liS ()I PI,'H'I e""!)l ( I R. 1.7(h)(.2) (.2I)(J.2) (
th"t
,Ihsent a concurrent conflict of interest. "" la\\\er mal' represent a client If . . the representatlllll is not prohlhlteJ hI' law").
2-16. SCI' Vinccnt R. Johnson, The Erhln of ( nllllllulllcarlng "Irli ['/lli/fll'e C/iI.I.\ .\felll!'ers. 17 RII. LIII(,. -197. :'i02 (l99i'» (indicating \\Ilh respect to \jodel Rule -1 ..2 and its
state-law counterparts that "the demands of the Rule cannot he wailed hI' the represented
per\on whose interests arc at stake").
:::-17. RISIAII\II"I (TIIIRI))()f IlIiLAI\ CJ')\IR",,(;L\\nIR~~ 21) CI1lI.c.deO()O).
~ll]e Restatement states:

2003]

"ABSOLUTE AND PERFECT CANDOR" TO CLIENTS

791

duties of an attorney can be varied. 2"!:--: Consequently, the demands
of "absolute and perfect candor" are limited by the existence of a
valid lawyer-client agreement to the contrary.:'..!')
F.

Harm to Client or Others

Finally. the disclosure obligations of attorneys may be limited if
disclosure would be harmful to the client or others. According to
the American Law Institute:
Under conditions of extreme necessity, a lawyer may properl\' refuse
for a client's own benefit to disclose documents to the client unless a
tribunal has required disclosure. Thus, a lawyer \\/110 reasonahly concludes that showing a psychiatric report to a mentally ill client is
likely to cause serious harm may deny the client access to the report.
Ordinarilv. however. what will he useful to the client is for the client
to decide::'5<1

The same principles apply wh\..'n disclosure threatens harm to
third persons.::''i l Presumably, unly the rare case \\ill justify
nondisclosure.

The appropriate extent of consultation is itself a proper suhject for consultation. The
client may ask for certain information ... or Illav express the wish not to he consulted
ahout certain decisions. The lawyer should ordinarily honor such wishcs .... To the
extent that the parties have not otherwise agreed. a standard of reasol1ahlcllCsS under
al/llzc cirCIIIIl.I{{/IlCCS dClerl11ines Ihe i1pprIJ[Jrilile lIleasure of COIISII1111 rioll. Reasonahleness depends upon such factors as the importance of the information or decision, the
extent to which disclosure or consultation hll\ alrcadv occurred. the clicnt"s sophistication and interest. and the time and monel tlLlt reporting or consultm" I\tli consume.
So far as consultation about specific deChl\lll\ 1\ concerned. the 1:lI\\'cr should also
consider the m()m for choice, the ahilitl ('I Ille client to shape the decl,!()n. and the
time Illllliahle..
'nle lawver mav refuse hl C(lil1rh \\ ; til unrca\ol1ablL (lic'llt requests
for information.

It!. (l.'mphasis addl.'d).
2..+x. See III. ~ I C) Clll!.

C (stating that ,,[ 1\lhl'n the client is sophisticakd in. . waivers,
informed consent ordillarilv permits the Il1krcl1l'c that thl' wailer is rC;l)Onllhk'"). Bill see
iii. ~ 20 cm!. h hLltllH' that '"[a]rticulate and ,<ll'ill\llcatcd clients
(;i11 lor frequent
cOll1ll1unicaliun \11th thclr !;l\I,vers when ;1 meltle'r 1\ ill1l'nrtllnt to them")
:'''+l). Sec allo !)Iiln,: L. Karpilliln. Flili/(Idl\ I )hllf!,lIlio/i1 {/I/(/ f'mclli,i/ flliln ill Dral/Illg CUIi.lcllrl.11i h..+..+ PR.\( 11'1:-'(; LAII 1:-.'1111 [I -- L.III<,.III<':-' 8.: /\I"II:-'I\II( IIIVI' PRA("·
1\[1 ('(ll RSI H 1:-'llll<)('K SIRII, Il)L ll):i 1:'1111I11.lillit/(/h!e!ll \VL 11..+..+ Pl.Il.il 191 (Slating
that in Call1(lrrll<l "[sll'ccific duties and flduCI:Il"\ \lhIIQatllll1'i can hl' \\;lIIe,!. .IS
as the
client execute, an informed written consent .. ).
2:iO. RISI\II \11">1 (THIRD) OF 1111 L\\\ (i()\1 1'.:-'1:-'(; L.\\\'lll{' Ii -+6 cmt. c (2000)
(citations omitted).
:''il. See id. ~ 2() cml. c (referring to harm t() ··the client or others"').
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Diminished client capacity may also justify a reduced amount of
disclosure. although in such cases "the lawyer must. as far as reasonably possible. maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship, "2:;2
Moreover. impaired mental capacity. while excusing some nondisclosures. may impose other obligations on attorneys. In Hefner v.
State. in upholding the conviction ()f an attorney for theft of client
funds. the appellate court held that the trial court did not err in
failing to give a mistake of fact instructionY'" It wrote: '-rnle attorney] was not entitled to an instruction on the mistake of fact
defense because his belief that the complainant consented [to the
transfer of funds to the attorney's operating account] \vas an unreasonable belief that an ordinary. prudent man acting in a fiduciary
relationship would not have held" hecause the attorneY knew of
the client's history of psychiatric rr(lhlems.c'~
V.

CO'.;(I l SIO'.;

It is easy to write expansively ahout the fiduciary obligations of
attorneys. and such rhetoric serves a useful purpose, It reminds
both practitioners and courts that members of the legal profession
have special duties because of the unique role they play in society
and that it is incumbent on all lawyers to adhere to high standards.
However. it is also important to think precisely about the professional conduct demanded of attorneys. which is to say it is important to "think like a lawyer." A careful review of the cases stating
that lawyers have a duty of "absolute and perfect candor" to clients
fails to demonstrate that there is a broadly applicable duty, enforceable in civil actions. to disclose information to a client even
when exercise of reasonable care \\ould not call for its disclosure.
Rather. the duty of "absolute 'md perfect candor" should be interpreted as limited to situations where the interests of attorney and
client are adverse. as in the case of d business transaction, or to the
few areas in which particular rules of conduct call for a high degree
of disclosure. slich as the rules relating to conflict
interest. client
property. contract initiation. and \cttlement offers. Outside of
these limited contexts. the disclosure ohligations of at torneys arc
better described by the rule of negligence than by a rule of "abso2)2. Id. ~ 2-t.( I ).
2:=;3. HlJ')Cr \. Stale. 7.1) S.\\'.2J
2)4. Id.

60~.

h2..+ (T\.'\.

r\pp,~I)alla~

Il)X7, writ rer-d).
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lute and perfect candor": an attorney must act reasonably in providing information to the client.
In all situations it is important to remember that the disclosure
obligations of attorneys are limited by a \'ariety of considerations
including scope of representation. materiality. client knowledge.
competing obligations to others. client agreement. and threatened
harm to the client or others. Regardless of whether disclosure obligations are imposed under negligence law or fiduciary duty law.
these considerations may justify the nondisclosure of information.

